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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-ALLOWANCE OF
FEDERAL TAX CLAIM AS A JUDGMENT
After the Government's claim for assessed taxes had been allowed
without contest by the bankruptcy court, suit was brought against
the estate of the deceased ex-bankrupt for the amount remaining
unpaid on the claim.' The statutory time limitation on enforcement
of the assessed tax had expired.2 The Government contended that
the limitation applied only to an original action on the assessment,
while the instant suit was to enforce a prior judgment of the bankruptcy court on which there is no statute of limitations against the
Government. The district court gave judgment for the United
States. On appeal, held, reversed. The allowance of a claim in bankruptcy is not a personal judgment against the bankrupt for any
balance not realized from the bankrupt's estate. Walley v. United
States, 259 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1958).
A properly assessed 3 federal tax may be collected within six years
by levy or court proceeding.4 Where the latter method is employed
and a judgment is obtained against the delinquent taxpayer, there
is no statute of limitations on the Government's enforcement of such
a judgment. 5 If a bankruptcy proceeding intervenes before collection,
1. "The taxes were regularly and timely assessed and the Bankruptcy

Court allowed the claim in the amount of $5,759.04 without contest having
been made. A dividend of $243.29 was paid to the government on the claim.
Nothing further was realized from the estate." 259 F.2d at 580.
2. The parties stipulated that the applicable statute, if any, was Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 28, § 3312(d), 53 Stat. 400 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 6502), which read: "Where the assessment of any tax imposed by this
title has been made within the statutory period of limitation... such tax may
be collected ... by a proceeding in court, but only if begun-() Within six
years after the assessment of the tax.. . ." The 1939 Code will remain applicable until all taxes imposed by that Code have been collected or compromised.
3. Assessment is the formal administrative act imposing a tax liability upon
a taxpayer, and, with certain exceptions, the amount of a tax imposed by the
Internal Revenue Code must be assessed within three years after the taxpayer's return is filed. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501.

4. See note 2 supra.

5. "The right to initiate a suit to enforce collection of a tax necessarily
implies the right to have its fruits, namely, judgments which are enforceable
by execution. No doubt Congress might have provided for a period of limitation beyond which judgments obtained by the Government for taxes should
be unenforceable, but, in the absence of any statute providing such a limitation .. . no court has power to restrict the right of the Government to enforce
a judgment to which it is lawfully entitled." United States v. Havner, 101
F.2d 161, 165 (8th Cir. 1939). Accord, Investment & Securities Co. v. United
States, 140 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1944), cf. United States v. Whited & Wheless,
Ltd., 246 U.S. 552 (1918).
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the district director should file a claim with the bankruptcy court.6

The six-year limitation on collection is suspended during any period
in which the assets of the taxpayer are in the control or custody of
a court and for six months thereafter.7 A tax claim is provable in
bankruptcy 8 and, if proved, is a demand against a fund in possession
of the court for distribution, 9 not an action in personam. 10 The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine all disputes regarding the
amount and validity of taxes claimed," and the court's allowance of
a claim is a judicial act 12 which is in effect a judgment. 13 But courts
of bankruptcy are of limited jurisdiction, 14 and their judgments are
conclusive only as to the estate which has been brought within their
custody. 15 A discharge 16 releases the bankrupt from all his debts,
with some important exceptions. One of the major exceptions is a
tax claim,17 which remains enforceable as if there had been no bankruptcy. 18
The United States conceded that the six-year limitation, 19 if applicable, had expired.20 In support of its contention that the allowance
6. Treas. Reg. § 301.6871(a)-2(b) (1958).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6503 (b). Under the 1939 Code the suspension
applied only to estate and gift taxes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 274(b),
53 Stat. 86, and ch. 4, § 1015 (b), 53 Stat. 153. The taxes in the instant case
were insurance contribution, unemployment, and witholding taxes. 259 F.2d
at 580.
8. Ingels v. Boteler, 100 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 308 U.S. 57 (1939); 2
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 797 (5th ed. rev. 1956)

(taxes provable by impli-

cation from §§ 1 (11), 17, 57(j) of The Bankruptcy Act).
9. In re Schaffner, 267 Fed. 977 (2d Cir. 1920).
10. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161 (1946).
11. In re Florence Commercial Co., 19 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275
U.S. 542 (1927); Cohen v. United States, 115 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1940).
12. In re Two Rivers Woodenware Co., 199 Fed. 877 (7th Cir. 1912).
13. In re John Osborn's Sons & Co., 177 Fed. 184 (2d Cir. 1910).
14. "Courts of bankruptcy, being of statutory origin, possess only such
jurisdiction and powers as are expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred upon them by the Bankruptcy Act." Chicago Bank of Commerce v.
Carter, 61 F.2d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 1932). Accord, Finn v. Carolina Portland
Cement Co., 232 Fed. 815 (5th Cir. 1916).
15. ' With regard to the estate of the bankrupt debtor, which has been ...
brought within the . . . jurisdiction of the court, its orders, decrees, and
judgments as to the right and title to the property ... are binding upon all
persons, and in every court." Abendroth v. Van Dolsen, 131 U.S. 66, 71
(1889). (Emphasis added.) Accord, In re McChesney, 58 F.2d 340 (S.D. Cal.
1931) (allowed claim is judgment to extent of bankrupt's estate, but not
against bankrupt); Massee & Felton Lumber Co. v. Benenson, 23 F.2d 107 (S.D.
N.Y. 1927) (claim is a petition to share in fund, and allowance thereof does
not determine bankrupt's personal liability); Goldstein v. Pearson, 121 A.2d
260 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956) (not a personal judgment).
16. The Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 1(15) (1952).
17. The Bankruptcy Act § 17(a) (1), 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 35(a) (1) (1952).
18. Consolidated Plan v. Bonitatibus, 130 Conn. 199, 33 A.2d 140 (1943);
Katzenstein v. Reid, Murdock & Co., 41 Tex. Civ. App. 106, 91 S.W. 360 (1906).
19. See note 2 supra.
20. "The tax assessments having been made in 1948, and this action not
having been commenced until well more than six years thereafter, this suit
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of a claim by the bankruptcy court constitutes a judgment which
may be enforced at any time, the Government relied principally on
five decisions.2 ' The trial court accepted these decisions as authoritative and said that they overruled, by implication, 22 the prior cases of
In re McChesney23 and Massee & Felton Lumber Co. v. Benenson.24
The latter cases had held that the allowance of a claim in bankruptcy
was a judgment only to the extent of the assets in the custody of the
court and did not determine the bankrupt's personal liability for any
unpaid balance. The court of appeals distinguished the cases on which
the Government relied as being concerned merely with the res judicata effect of the allowance or disallowance of a claim by a bankruptcy
court. 25 In reaffirming the rationale of the McChesney and Benenson
decisions the court pointed out that the jurisdiction granted to the
court by the Bankruptcy Act is expressly limited to the allowance or
disallowance of claims against bankrupt estates.26 The court discussed
but did not decide whether the allowance of a claim without contest
would be res judicata if the Government sought to enforce its claim
for the unpaid balance by a subsequent suit within the statutory
27
period of limitation.
is clearly barred unless the allowance of the claim .
amounted to a judgment ... as to which there is no statute of limitations affecting the United
States." United States v. Walley, 160 F.Supp. 67, 69 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
21. United States v. Ettelson, 159 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1947); Investment &
Securities Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1944); United States v.
Coast Wineries, 131 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1942); Lewith v. Irving Trust Co., 67 F.2d
855 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. American Surety Co., 56 F.2d 734 (2d Cir.
1932).
22. United States v. Walley, 160 F.Supp. 67, 71 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
23. 58 F.2d 340 (S.D. Cal. 1931). See note 15 supra.
24. 23 F.2d 107 (S.D. N.Y. 1927). See note 15 supra.
25. "Lewith v. Irving Trust Co .....
.was merely concerned with the res
judicata effect of a prior claim as between the Trustee and a creditor with
respect to the estate in bankruptcy.... United States v. Coast Wineries ...
and United States v. American Surety Co. of New York .... deal with the res
judicata effect of bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to a proof of claim . . .
These cases do not involve the question of whether the bankruptcy proceeding
resulted in a personal judgment against the bankrupt. They deal with the
question of whether creditors who were parties in the bankruptcy proceeding
are estopped to deny certain findings of fact and conclusions of law in those
proceedings." 259 F.2d at 581. The court did not distinguish the Ettelson and
Investment & Securities Co. cases, both cited note 21 supra, since they were
cited to support the proposition that once the United States had obtained a
judgment there is no statute of limitations on the enforcement of such a judgment. The court of appeals agreed with this contention.
26. "The jurisdictional grant of the Bankruptcy Court is contained in Section
2, sub. a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act.... It is given the power to 'Allow claims,
(and) disallow claims . . . against bankrupt estates' (Emphasis added). We
think the wording of the statute is clear and confines the operation of the
allowance of a claim to the bankrupt estate in existence at the time of the
institution of the bankruptcy proceedings." 259 F.2d at 581.
27. "Had the government . . . sued the bankrupt within the permissible
period of limitations, the bankrupt perhaps would have been estopped to deny
the effect of the allowance of the claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. However, this could not be predicated on the ground that the prior proceeding was
a judgment against him in personam." 259 F.2d at 582. 5 REMWINGTON, BAuK-
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The objects of the bankruptcy laws are to secure a just distribution
of the bankrupt's property among his creditors and to effect the
release of the bankrupt from the obligation to pay his debts.28 The
express privileges granted to the Government by the Bankruptcy
Act 29 are not so much designed to aid in the collection of taxes as
they are to restrain interference with the collection process. Thus
the court in the instant case correctly declined to bestow an additional
advantage on the Government which Congress had not seen fit to
provide.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION-RESIDENCE AS
A JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR DIVORCE
Plaintiff-husband sued for divorce in Arkansas under a statute
which declared in effect that residence, rather than domicile, was a
sufficient jurisdictional requirement for divorce.' Upon a finding by
the lower court that plaintiff was not domiciled in Arkansas, defendant
sought to have the suit dismissed, urging that the statute was void in
that the legislature had no power to substitute residence, in the sense
of physical presence only, for domicile as the basis for jurisdiction.
The lower court dismissed the suit. On appeal, held, reversed. A
statute conferring jurisdiction to render a divorce on the basis of
residence alone is not unconstitutional under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment 2 Wheat v. Wheat, 318 S.W.2d 793 (Ark.
1958).
RUPTCY § 2313 (5th ed. 1953) suggests that the allowance of a claim would be
binding on the bankrupt in subsequent litigation with the creditor, since the
bankrupt is under a duty, by § 7 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, to object to
claims, when presented to him, if not proper. Cf. Maryland Casualty Co. v.
United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 203, 32 F.Supp. 746 (1940), holding that the referee's
disallowance of a claim of the U.S. for taxes is res judicata in an action
brought by the bankrupt's surety to recover from the United States the
amount of excess taxes for which the surety had been required to respond
in a suit against it by the United States on a deficiency tax bond.
28. Wilson v. City Bank, 84 U.S. 473 (1872).
29. Under the Bankruptcy Act the Government's claim for taxes is exempt
from discharge. See note 17 supra. Further, the act in § 64 gives the Government's tax claim a priority. The Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (4), 30 Stat. 563
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (4) (1952).
1. "The word 'residence' as used in Section 34-1208 is defined to mean actual
presence and upon proof of such the party alleging and offering such proof
shall be considered domiciled in the State and this is declared to be the legislative intent and public policy of the State of Arkansas." ARK. STAT. § 341208.1 (1957). The court in the instant case construed this as substituting residence, in the sense of physical presence, for domicile as the jurisdictional basis
for divorce. Wheat v. Wheat, 318 S.W.2d 793 (Ark. 1958).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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It is generally recognized that domicile of at least one of the parties
is a prerequisite to jurisdiction for granting a divorce.3 Such a decree
is entitled to full faith and credit although the defendant spouse was
not present.4 A divorce granted in a jurisdiction where neither party
was domiciled s not entitled to recognition in other states, 5 although
if the defendant was present he may be precluded from attacking the
decree on the grounds of res judicata. 6 The Supreme Court has never
decided whether a divorce granted where neither party was domiciled
may be valid at the place where rendered and yet not entitled to full
faith and credit. Scattered statements in Williams v. North Carolina
(II)7 indicate a view that without domicile no state has jurisdiction
to grant a divorce that is valid anywhere. 8 In Alton v. Alton,9 the
3. "A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve a
marriage when neither spouse is domiciled within the state." RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 111 (1934). See also GoODRIC CONrLCT OF LAWS § 127
(3d ed. 1949). Goodrich states "only a court at the domicile has jurisdiction to
grant a divorce." (cases cited) Id. at 397. The marriage relationship is said
to be a matter of public concern in which the state has a vital interest; the
state having that interest being the state of domicile. Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir.
1953). GOODRICH, op. cit. supra at 396. As divorce has been thought to be the
responsibility of the domicile, divorce litigation has been called an action in
rem, but that they are more than mere in personam actions. Williams v.
North Carolina (I), supra at 297.
4. Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
5. Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945). For commentary
and analysis of the Williams case, see Powell, And Repent at Leisure, an Inquiry into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom Nevada Hath Joined Together
and North Carolina Hath Put Asunder, 58 HARv. L. REV. 930 (1945). For a
complete discussion of the problem raised by the cases see Griswold, Divorce
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1951); Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees
-Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1955).
6. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
Following these cases, the Supreme Court held that if a person cannot collaterally attack the decree by the law of the rendering state, he cannot do so
elsewhere. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
7. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).

8. "A judgment in one state is conclusive upon the merits in every other

State, but only if the court of the first State had power to pass on the meritshad jurisdiction, that is to render the judgment.... Under our system of law,
judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded
on domicil. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14. The
framers of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite,
and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-speaking
world has questioned it." 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). Mr. Justice Murphy, con-

curring, makes a distinction between the internal and external power of
Nevada, saying that "Nevada has unquestioned authority, consistent with procedural due process, to grant divorces on whatever basis it sees fit to all who
meet its statutory requirements.

It is entitled, moreover, to give to its

divorce decrees absolute and binding finality within the confines of its borders.

"But if Nevada's divorce decrees are to be accorded full faith and credit in
the courts of her sister states it is essential that Nevada have proper jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings." Id. at 239.

Justices Rutledge and Black, in separate dissents, contended that the divorces were valid in Nevada, and that thus the majority denied full faith and
credit without determining that the decrees were invalid in the rendering
state. Mr. Justice Rutledge argued that the judgment was valid in Nevada
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leading case on this point, the Third Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Goodrich, held that a divorce rendered by a state wherein neither
party is domiciled is an invalid attempt to affect an interest without
jurisdiction and contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.10
In rejecting the reasoning and holding of the Alton case, 11 the
Arkansas court held that due process does not require domicile as the
sole basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to grant a divorce.12 It was
stated that even if the statute defining residence as actual presence
deprives the divorce of extraterritorial validity when there is no
finding of domicile, the legislature had the power to say that this disadvantage was outweighed by the benefits of the statute.13 A strong
dissent, relying chiefly on Alton, argued that as domicile is the jurisagainst any attack. Id. at 244. Mr. Justice Black thought that the Court recognized that the decrees were valid under Nevada law, but declared them
invalid under the due process clause, id. at 271, deciding the matter as though
it were purely a federal question. Id. at 268. For a discussion of these views
see Powell, supranote 5.
9. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
10. Id. at 676. "An attempt by another jurisdiction to affect the relation of
a foreign domiciliary is unconstitutional even though both parties are in court
and neither one raises the question." Id. at 677. See also Jennings v. Jennings,
251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948) (statute permitting non-resident couples to
confer jurisdiction by consent and thus obtain an Alabama divorce held
invalid on the theory that domicile is a prerequisite to jurisdiction). Contra,
Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958) (held within the power
of the legislature to establish bases of jurisdiction for divorce other than
domicile). The Seventh Circuit has held that there could be a divorce decree
valid at home but invalid elsewhere. Sutton v. Leib, 188 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.
1951). In discussing this case, Judge Goodrich, in Alton, stated that it was an
application of the full faith and credit clause, not involved in Alton. "But if
the opinion ... was directed at the validity of a divorce decree in the rendering state before subsequent proceedings call for the application of the full
faith and credit clause, we are, with due deference, compelled to disagree."
Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 675 (3d Cir. 1953). The court generalized in
saying that due process at home and full faith and credit were correlative.
Id. at 676. The dissenting opinion found nothing in the rule requiring domicile
for jurisdiction that entitled it to constitutional sanction. Id. at 681. Judge
Hastie's dissent stated further that the Supreme Court had not held that due
process and full faith and credit were of the same dimensions in this area.
Id. at 684. In reasoning that the due process clause did not prevent adjudication of divorce in any state having personal jurisdiction over both spouses, the
dissent stated that if such were the rule, a choice of law problem would
necessarily arise. Id. at 684. For further discussion of the choice of law
problem see Sumner, supra note 5, at 19. Certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court in the Alton case, but it was dismissed as moot since one of
the parties had obtained a second divorce in another state. The Virgin
Islands statute was later declared invalid, but not on the basis of the due
process clause. The Court decided on the grounds that the legislature, in
enacting the statute, had exceeded the power granted it by Congress. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
11. 318 S.W. 20 at 796.
12. Id. at 797.
13. The court states that even without the statute, the acceptance of an
Arkansas divorce decree by a foreign court will depend on whether that
court finds that Arkansas domicile did exist. 318 S.W.2d at 796. The concurring opinion states that any divorce granted under the statute will "prob-

ably be worth only the paper it is printed on" in sister states. Id. at 798.
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dictional test for recognition of a foreign divorce decree, the same
test should determine the validity of the decree in the rendering state,
and the rationale of the Alton case should be followed. 14
The concept of domicile as a jurisdictional basis is an elusive and
nebulous one which necessitates delving into a party's mental inclinations.'5 The problem of which state is the domicile has given the
courts much trouble. 16 Alternative bases have been suggested, each
with shortcomings of its own.1 7 The chief concern in this area is that
the state having the paramount interest in the marriage relationship
should not lose control over the domestic relations of its citizens, as
it would should a divorce be granted by another state with more lax
divorce laws. Although the state of domicile has an interest, perhaps
the dominant one, it is difficult to see how its concern is so pervasive
as to exclude the interest of other states having vital connections with
the parties and the marriage relationship, even though of lesser degree
than those of the domicile. Perhaps the solution would be to allow
states having any vital connection with a party and his status to
render a decree, with the Supreme Court setting forth a definite
choice of law rule which must be followed. 8 The due process clause
could then be used to correct states which passed beyond proper
choice of law rules. 9 The Supreme Court may change its mind on
the theory of the Williams cases and announce any of several rules
which have been suggested. 20 There is no requirement of domicile
found in the Constitution, and Congress has not decreed one. Obviously, the decision of a state court cannot be controlling on this
issue. The question must ultimately be decided by the Supreme
14. 318 S.W.2d at 798. The dissent argued against a "judicial double standard under which the court of one state fondly embraces a jurisdictional
practice within its own realm which it condemns as downright reprehensible
when indulged in by the courts of a sister state." Id. at 805.
15. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 682 (1953) (dissent); Sumner, Full
Faithand Credit For Divorce Decrees-PresentDoctrine and Possible Changes,
9 VND. L. REV. 1, 13 (1955).
16. See Knapp, Solutions of the Double Domicil Problem, 15 CoNN. B.J. 251
(1941), cited in Sumner, supra note 15, at 14.
17. Sumner, supra note 15, at 14-19. (a) Place of marriage: often the only
contract with the state is the ceremony, which interest may not be substantial
enough to confer jurisdiction. (b) Matrimonial domicile: today, upon separation one or both parties often leave and establish separate homes in other
states, severing all ties with this state. The remaining interest, if any, might
be insufficient under due process to confer jurisdiction for divorce. (c) Residence: here there may still be relitigation of the jurisdiction fact, i.e., residence for the required time, in a later suit, just as with domicile. A rule
requiring residence only would slight the interests of the state of domicile
and of matrimonial domicile.
18. For a discussion of this theory and the choice of law problem involved,
see Sumner, supra note 15, at 19-25.
19. The due process clause has been so used before, e.g., Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Alton V.

Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 677 (1953) and cases cited therein.
20. See note 16 supra.
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Court, holding either that domicile is necessary for jurisdiction, or

that some lesser requirement is necessary, with or without an established choice of law rule.

CORPORATIONS-SECURITIES ACTS-DISTINCTION
BETWEEN "CLASS" AND "SERIES" UNDER
SECTION 16(b) OF SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
Plaintiff brought a statutory action under section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act 1 to recover profits made by defendant shareholder through its trading of corporate stock. Section 16 (b) provides
for recovery on behalf of the corporation of so-called "short swing"
profits 2 made by any director, officer, or owner of ten per cent or more
of any class of its securities. 3 The articles of the corporation author-,
ized the issuance of 150,000 shares of cumulative preferred stock.
Pursuant thereto, 75,000 shares with a 4% per cent dividend rate
were initially issued. Subsequently, 25,000 shares were issued providing for a dividend rate of 33/ per cent. At the time of the transaction in question defendent owned more than ten per cent of the
33/4 per cent stock, but, including its holdings of the 41/ per cent
shares, it possessed less than ten per cent of all outstanding cumulative preferred. Plaintiff contended that for the purposes of 16 (b)
the 44 per cent and the 33 per cent preferred constituted separate
classes. Defendant asserted that these two stock issues were different
1. This statutory action is specifically provided for in the Securities Exchange Act:
"(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security
of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of
less than six months ...

shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,

irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director,
or officer. . .

."

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896, 15

U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952). This section has been a powerful legislative force
in preventing inside profits by directors, officers, and large shareholders.

2. For purposes of § 16(b), a short swing profit is any profit realized by a
purchase and sale of any stock of a corporation within a six month period.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952). See Loss,

SECURITIES REGULATION

564 (1951).

3. "To prevent the unfair use of inside information' for the purpose of
speculation Congress included a provision in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, that every person who as director, officer or beneficial owner of more
than ten per cent of any class of 'equity security' . . . must file a statement
and report each month the changes of ownership as to such securities which
have occurred during the month. Any profit realized from any purchase or
sale of any equity security within a period of less than six months is made
recoverable by the issuer without the need of proving unfair use of official
information." BALLANTME, CORPORATIONS 216 (rev. ed. 1946).
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series within the same class, and therefore it did not own the necessary percentage of any one class required to bring the transaction
within the purview of 16 (b). Held, for the defendant. Where the only
substantial difference between two issues of corporate stock is the dividend rate, and they have identical voting rights, they are to be treated
as one class for purposes of section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act.
Ellerinv. MassachusettsMutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
Prior to the passage of the Securities Exchange Act, directors, officers, and principal shareholders often used inside information obtdmed
by virtue of their positions to speculate in the securities of their own
corporations. 4 Such information was not usually available to the
smaller shareholders. 5 One of the primary purposes of the act was
to protect the "outside" shareholders against profits made by insiders
through the use of such advance information. 6 The instant case is
one of first impression, the distinction between "class" and "series"
not previously having been made for the purposes of 16 (b) .7 However,
it has been recognized that such a problem was likely to arise,8
especially in the case of preferred shares because of the common
practice of issuing various series within the same class. 9 When such
series are issued there can arise the perplexing question as to whether
subsequent series are not in reality separate classes.'0 It has been
suggested that local incorporation laws be consulted to distinguish
4. For a discussion of this problem see Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231 (2d Cir. 1943); Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025 (1934). See also 32 MCH. L. REV. 678 (1934);
Hearings on S. 84 Before Committee on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934).

5. Hearings on S. 56 and S. 97, Before Committee on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st &2d Sess. (1934).
6. Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, Before Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943); Loss, SECURITIES IEGULATION 564
(1951).
7. "This question of the distinction between 'class' and 'series' is a matter
of novel impression under the 'insider's profit' provision of the Securities
Exchange Act." 167 F. Supp. at 73.
8. Seligman, Problems Under The Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV.

1,7 (1934).
9. "In order to determine whether a person owns more than 10% of any
class of an equity security, questions will frequently arise as to what constitutes a class. Especially in the case of preferred stock it has been the practice
frequently to issue what are termed series of preferred stock varying in
certain respects. Is each series a separate class for the purpose of the Act?
If not, is the test solely whether a particular category of stock is termed a
separate class or a separate series? While it is arguable that this view is a

formal one, nevertheless it would seem that it was the correct one and that

reference can properly be made to the local laws of incorporation for the
purpose of determining what is a separate class and what is merely a separate
series." Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L.

REV. 1, 7 (1934).
10. Ibid.
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class and series." In fact, many states do statutorily authorize the
issuance of a class of stock consisting of several series.12
The court here noted that local laws made it permissible to create
a class of stock and then issue various series.13 However, the theory
that local law was controlling in differentiating class and series was
rejected; 14 rather, the similarities and differences between the two
issues were analyzed for this purpose. 15 It was noted that both had
the same par value; that there was no preference as to dividends;
that both had the same limited voting rights; and that neither had preemptive rights. These similarities indicated that the stock involved
constituted only one class. On the other hand differences in dividend
rates, redemption prices, and dates of issuance gave some support to
plaintiff's contention that the 41/4 per cent and the 33 per cent stock
constituted different classes. 16 The court concluded that the controlling
11. Ibid.

12. Under this type of statute the restrictions of the various classes are
fixed in the charter or articles of incorporation. However, the directors are
authorized to vary such items as the dividend rate and the liquidation price
with the issue of each successive share. See BALLANTINE & LATTIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS IN THE LAW OF CoRPoATIONS 379-84 (1939); Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business CorporationLaw, 1886-1936, 50 HARv. L. REV. 27 (1936);
Berle, Corporate Devises for Diluting Stock Participations,31 CoLumVE. L. REV.
1239, 1263 (1931). These kind of shares are sometimes referred to as "blank
shares." Ballantine states: "In general the preferences and restrictions of
any class of preferred shares will be fixed in the charter or articles of incorporation. The financing of an enterprise goes on year after year, as business
expands or the needs of capital arise. New issues of securities will be made
from time to time and it may be necessary to meet changing market conditions as to the dividend rate and other terms of the preferred share contract.
In order to avoid the expense and delay of amendments of the charter, some
modem corporation laws permit the directors to be authorized in the charter
to vary the dividend rate, the liquidation price and some other financial terms
of new series of preferred shares to adjust these terms to market needs. A
number of recent statutes authorize classes of preferred shares to be subdivided by the directors into series, if this is provided for in the charter. A
series of shares is a sub-class or subdivisions of a class. There seems no reason
why the board of directors should not be given much the same freedom in
fixing the financial terms of unissued preferred shares that it has in respect
to the terms of notes, debentures, and bonds. In general each series of a
class should have the same priorities that are given to other series and the
directors should not be given power to undermine the rights of shares already
outstanding." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 471 (rev. ed. 1946).
13. The company in the instant case was an Ohio corporation. The applicable law is OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.06 (Baldwin 1957): "(A) The express
terms of shares may include statements specifying: (12) The right of directors, subject to such limitations as may be stated, to adopt amendments to
the articles in respect of any unissued or treasury shares of any class and
thereby to fix or change: the division of such shares into series and the
designation and authorized number of shares of each series; the dividend rate;
the dates of payment of dividends and the dates from which they are cumulative; liquidation price, redemption rights and price; sinking fund requirements; conversion right; and restrictions on the issuance of shares of any
class or series."
14. 167 F. Supp. at 79.
15. Id. at 76-78.
16. Ibid.
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factor was that both issues had the same voting rights, and thus were
series comprising a single class.17
By broadly defining class to include separate series having substantial differences, the decision rendered tends to defeat the legislative
intent of the Securities Exchange Act. Such an interpretation allows
the defendant to escape the sanctions of 16(b) although he is a
principal shareholder within the meaning of that section. The court
based its ruling primarily on the fact that this stock had very limited
voting rights. However, it is questionable as to whether this should
be the determining factor. Certainly, full voting rights are not a
prerequisite for a large shareholder to have access to inside information.
The problem of defining class for the purposes of section 16 is a
difficult one. If local law is looked to, non-conformity and confusion
will result. A solution to the problem may be supplementary federal
legislation. Congress could decide that successive stock issues would
be considered as separate classes, unless substantially identical. But
what is the meaning of the phrase "substantially identical"? This
should be determined by the courts in light of the purpose of section
16 (b) and the equities of each particular case. 18

CORPORATIONS-STOCK DIVIDENDS-INCONSISTENCY
BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND MODERN
CONCEPTS OF STOCK DIVIDENDS
In a deed of trust the settlor included a special provision which required the trustee to transfer to the settlor or his executor all stock
dividends which might be received on the principal stock.' One of
17. "The most important single factor in determining whether a series of

stock is 'class' for the purpose of a statute regulating transactions by insiders

who may be making unfair use of inside information, is voting rights." 167
F. Supp. at 78.
18. For other problems concerning § 16(b) see 25 So. CAL. L. R.v. 475
(1952); Comment, 27 TExAs L. REV. 840 (1949). See also Ferraiolo v. F. R.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
259 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1958). In the Ferraiolo case defendant converted preferred stock into common stock and the court held that this was not a purchase

within the meaning of § 16. The Newman case concerned the definition of the
§ 16(b) term "profit." The court in finding for defendant concluded that the
profit shown on defendant's income tax return was not necessarily profit
within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act.

1. The deed of trust, executed in 1918, contained a special provision regarding the treatment of stock dividends as follows: "Anything hereinabove contained to the contrary notwithstanding, said Trustee shall transfer to the
said Donor, or if he is dead, to his executor or administrator, free of all trusts
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2
the stocks held in trust was subjected to a three-for-one conversion.
Concurrently, the company transferred earned surplus to the capital
account 3 in compliance with a statute forbidding the impairment of
capital. 4 In an action for construction of the deed of trust with reference to these stock distributions, the beneficiaries argued first, that
the transaction in reality constituted a stock split-up,5 and second,
that even if the distribution in part constituted a stock dividend, the
number of shares allocable to the settlor's legatee6 under the special
trust provision should be no more than the total number of shares
whose aggregate fair market value equalled the amount of earned
surplus capitalized. 7 The trial court ruled that the amount of new
stock whose aggregate par value was equivalent to the amount of
earned surplus transferred to capital constituted a stock dividend
within the meaning of the trust instrument. 8 On appeal, held,
affirmed. A stock dividend consists of a distribution to shareholders
of additional stock accompanied by the transfer of accumulated sur-

hereby created, any and all stock dividends which it may from time to time
receive on any stocks held by it hereunder." The use of such a provision in
the trust instrument precludes the problem of determining whether the stock
dividend should be allocated to income or to principal. For discussions of
that problem see 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 878 (1957); 6 VAND. L. Rzv. 416 (1952).
2. The deed of trust created two identical trusts with principals originally
consisting of 300 shares of General Electric common stock. By April of 1954
the trustee held 1200 shares of General Electric no-par value common stock
in each trust. On April 20, 1954 an annual shareholders' meeting was held at
which a resolution was adopted to change the 35,000,000 shares of common
stock without par value, which the Company was authorized to issue, into
105,000,000 shares of common stock with a par value of $5 each.
3. On February 26, 1954 the Board of Directors adopted a resolution providing that the capital of the Company be increased from $180,287,046 to
$432,688,910.40 by the transfer of $252,401,864.40 from earned surplus to the
capital account; and that such transfer should be made upon the adoption
by the shareholders of the resolution authorizing the stock conversion.

4. N.Y. STOCK CORP.

LAw § 58.

5. The beneficiaries contended that the nature of the stock distribution
should be determined by the substance and intent of the action taken by the
distributing corporation judged in accordance with the rules of disclosure
and accounting promulgated in the New York Stock Exchange, Company
Manual §§ A 13, A 14 (1955); and the American Institute of Accountants,
Accounting Research Bull. No. 42 (1953).
6. The settlor died in 1926, leaving a will in which the respondent, the
American Museum of Natural History, was named as sole residuary legatee.
7. Both the American Institute of Accountants and the New York Stock
Exchange require that shares distributed as stock dividends be capitalized at
their fair value. American Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research
Bull. No. 43, at 51 (1953); New York Stock Exchange, Company Manual
§ A 13, at 235 (1955).
8. The trial court held that 7/12ths (the ratio of new capital to total
capital) of the new stock was attributable to the capitalization of earned surplus and constituted a stock dividend. In re Fosdick's Trust, 147 N.Y.S.2d 509,
512, 518 (1955). Each trust received 3600 shares of the new stock, of which
7/12ths or 2100 shares constituted a stock dividend distributable to the American Museum of Natural History. Id. at 518. This resulted in a reduction of
the beneficiaries income from the trusts from $11,520 to $4,800 a year. Brief
for Appellants, p. 9, In re Fosdick's Trust, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 152 N.E.2d 228, 176
N.Y.S.2d 966 (1958).
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plus to the corporation's capital account, and in determining the
number of newly distributed shares attributable to the new capital,
no reference is had to market value. In re Fosdick's Trust, 4 N.Y.2d
646, 152 N.E.2d 228, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1958).9
A stock dividend consists of two elements: (1) the transfer of a
certain amount of accumulated surplus to the corporate capital account, and (2) the distribution of additional shares of stock by the
corporation to its shareholders. 10 A stock split-up consists simply of
9. For other decisions holding that 7/12ths of this same General Electric
stock distribution constituted a stock dividend, see In re Bryan's Trust, 6
Misc.2d 468, 162 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Estate of Boissevain, N.Y.L.J.
Feb. 6, 1956, p. 8 (Surr. Ct.); In re Lissberger's Estate, 145 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Surr.
Ct. 1955); In re Muller's Estate, 145 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Surr. Ct. 1955); Matter of

Sonneborn, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 27, 1958, p. 6 (Surr. Ct.).
10. Bass v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 129 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1942);

Lich v. United States Rubber Co., 39 F. Supp. 675 (D.N.J. 1941), aff'd per

curiam, 123 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1941); United States v. Siegel, 52 F.2d 63 (8th

Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 679 (1931); Williams v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 93 N.Y. 162 (1883); Matter of Sanford, 4 Misc. 2d 487, 161 N.Y.S.2d
507, (Surr. Ct. 1957); In re Davis' Estate, 128 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Surr. Ct. 1953);
In re Strong's Will, 198 Misc. 7, 96 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Surr. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 277 App.
Div. 1157, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1950); In re Lissberger's Estate, 189 Misc. 277,
71 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Surr. Ct. 1947), af'd, 273 App. Div. 881, 78 N.Y.S.2d 199
(1948), leave to appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 934 (1948); In re Norton's Will, 129
Misc. 875, 224 N.Y.S. 77 (Surr. Ct. 1927). See also Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 198 (1920); Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 (1890); Matter of Osborne,
209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913); Robertson v. Brulator, 188 N.Y. 301, 80
N.E. 938 (1907); In re Horrmann's Estate, 3 App. Div. 2d 5, 157 N.Y.S.2d 704
(1956); In re Thorns' Trust, 3 Misc.2d 784, 152 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
The capitalization of accumulated surplus without the distribution of additional stock will not constitute a stock dividend. People ex rel. Adams Electric
Light Co. v. Graves, 272 N.Y. 77, 4 N.E.2d 941 (1936). The transferred surplus
may be either earned surplus or capital surplus. See In re Bryan's Trust, 6
Misc. 2d 468, 162 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1957); In re Lawrie's Estate, 119
N.Y.S.2d 906 (Surr. Ct. 1953); cf. In re Bingham's Trust, 11 Misc. 2d 367, 161
N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1957), mod., 4 App. Div. 937, 167 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1957).
Some courts have held that, in the absence of proof of the actual intent of the
directors, surplus must be capitalized simultaneously with the issuance of the
new stock if the distribution is to be held a stock dividend. See In re Lindsay's Will, 11 Misc. 2d 374, 109 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In re Strong's
Will, 198 Misc. 7, 96 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Surr. Ct. 1950), ajfd, 277 App. Div. 1157, 101

N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1950). Other courts have recognized a stock dividend although

the capitalization of surplus occurred prior to the stock distribution. See In
re Bryan's Trust, 6 Misc. 2d 468, 162 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (several
months intervened between the two transactions).
A dividend paid in the stock of other corporations is not a stock dividend,
but is the same as a cash dividend. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Ernst,
263 N.Y. 342, 189 N.E. 241 (1934). A dividend paid by a parent corporation
in stock of subsidiary is not a stock dividend. Id. at 346, 189 N.E. at 242. A
stock dividend declared by a subsidiary is not a stock dividend of the parent
corporation. Id. at 347, 189 N.E. at 243. A dividend declared to be payable,
at the shareholder's election, either in cash or stock is not a stock dividend.
Kellogg v. Kellogg, 166 Misc. 791, 4 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1938), af'd sub
nom., Kellogg v. Neale, 254 App. Div. 812, 5 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1938). A dividend
in cash with the right to purchase new stock is not a stock dividend. Id.
at 221.
A stock dividend is not a true dividend. It is not a distribution of corporate
earnings and does not change the proportionate interest of the shareholders
in the corporate enterprise, but merely gives the shareholders additional
evidence representing that interest. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
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an increase in the number of shares of a given class without any
transfer of surplus to the capital account. 1 The capitalization of
surplus is a legal requirement 12 designed to insure that the new
13
shares are supported by an adequate increase in the legal capital 14
and to prevent the issuance of new shares without consideration.
When a dividend of par value stock is declared most statutes require
the transfer of an amount equal to the par value of the shares issued; 5
when the dividend consists of no-par value stock the statutes may
leave the determination almost entirely to the directors, 16 or they
may require capitalization on the basis of the estimated fair value
per dividend share or the average original consideration received
per share previously outstanding.'7 The amount capitalized per
dividend share must be equal to at least the minimum requirements
set by the laws of the state of incorporation, 8 but the directors are
not precluded from directing the transfer of a greater amount computed on a different basis, e.g., the fair market value per share as of
the date of the dividend declaration, or the average amount of
(1920); Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 (1890); Merrit-Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. New York Trust Co., 184 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1950); Powell v. Maryland
Trust Co., 125 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1942); Williams v. Western Union Telegraph

Co., 93 N.Y. 162 (1883). "In essence the thing that has been done is to distribute a symbol purporting to represent an amount of accumulated profits
which is already invested in the business and which is to remain there as
capital." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 483 (rev. ed. 1946).
11. The feature that distinguishes a stock dividend from a stock split-up is
the permanent retention of earnings and profits in the business through the
capitalization of accumulated surplus. In re Davis' Estate, 128 N.Y.S.2d 152
(Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Lawrie's Estate 119 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Surr. Ct. 1953);
In re Lissberger's Estate 189 Misc. 277, 71 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Surr. Ct. 1947),
aff'd, 273 App. Div. 881, 78 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1948), leave to appeal denied, 298
N.Y. 934 (1948); see also BALLANTINE, CoRPORATioNs 483 (rev. ed. 1946).
12. The rule that dividend shares must be accompanied by a capitalization
of surplus is a legal requirement governed by statute in most states. Even in
the absence of any express statutory requirements, it is generally recognized
that a stock dividend, being a new issue of shares, increases the legal capital
by an amount equal to the par or stated value of the shares issued. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 485 (rev. ed. 1946).
13. "The purpose of requiring surplus to be transferred and capitalized
upon the issue of share dividends is to give some assurance that there is
adequate net worth or value behind the shares .... " Id. at 484. "Similar principles to those giving rise to liability for stock which has been sold for a
consideration less than the stated or par value, prevail in the analogous dividend situation." KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 174 (1941).
14. "Limitations on 'dividends' in shares are in reality simply restrictions on
the issue of new shares without consideration except capitalization of surplus ... ." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 481 (rev. ed. 1946).
15. KEHL, CORPORATE DiVmENDs 176 (1941).
16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 173 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.17
(Smith-Hurd 1954); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3506 (1949); OMo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701-33 (Baldwin 1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-702.1 (1958).
17. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1506 (Deering 1947) (estimated fair value);
MVcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.22 (1937) (average original consideration); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 301.22 (1947) (estimated fair value).
18. The legal requirements for capitalization of surplus are minimum requirements, which may not necessarily be proper accounting requirements
under individual circumstances.

1959 ]

RECENT CASES

capital paid in per share.19 The number of dividend shares represented
by a known transfer of surplus to capital is the quotient of the total
amount transferred divided by the amount transferred per share as
prescribed by the directors. 20 The courts, however, in making this
determination, have consistently used the par or stated value per
21
share, and no reference is had to market value.
The disclosure and accounting policies of the New York Stock Exchange22 and the American Institute of Accountants,2 3 relied upon by
the beneficiaries in the instant case, would apply a more restricted
meaning to the term "stock dividend." These policies are premised
upon the supposition that many shareholders look upon stock dividends as the equivalent of distributions of corporate earnings equal
in amount to the fair value of the shares received.24 The policies are
designed to achieve a two-fold purpose; (1) to insure proper disclosure of the true nature of all stock distributions, and (2) to insure
that stock dividends more nearly comport with the popular conception
entertained by the recipient shareholders as to the relation of stock
dividends to current earnings, and their effect on the shareholder's
19. The various bases for determining the amount per dividend share to be
transferred from surplus to capital may be summarized as follows:
A. Minimum legal requirements: For par value shares, the par value; for
no-par value shares, the stated value.
B. Other bases: For shares with or without par value:
(1) The average amount per share of all paid-in capital applicable to
the stock-the total amount received for the outstanding shares, represented
by credits to all paid-in capital accounts applicable to the shares, divided by
the number of shares outstanding.
(2) The average original paid-in capital per share-the total amount
received for the outstanding shares divided by the number of shares outstanding.
(3) The average amount per share credited to the capital stock accountthe total amount credited to the capital stock account for the outstanding
shares, divided by the number of shares outstanding.
(4) The fair market value per share as of the date of the dividend declaration. HOLMES, MAYNARD, EDWARDS & M=-ER, INTERMEDIATE AcCOUmuNTG 620
(3d ed. 1958); JoHNsoN, ITRmEDmAT AcCOUNTING 423 (rev. ed. 1958).
20.
number of shares
_ total accumulated surplus
constituting the stock dividend - transferred to capital account
amount transferred per share
as prescribed by the directors
21. See In re Horrmann's Estate, 3 App. Div. 2d 5, 157 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1956);
Matter of Sanford, 4 Misc. 2d 487, 161 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In re
Strong's Will, 198 Misc. 7, 96 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Surr. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 277 App. Div.
1157, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1950).
22. New York Stock Exchange, Company Manual §§ A 13, A 14 (1955).
23. American Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research Bull. No. 43
(1953).
24. Id. at 51. The capitalization of earnings through stock dividends has
been characterized as a condensation of two transactions; (1) a pro-rata
distribution in cash and (2) a pro-rata reinvestment of cash by the recipient
shareholders. PATON, AcCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 1016 (3d ed. 1943). The policies of the American Institute of Accountants and the New York Stock
Exchange seem to be in line with this analysis.
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equity in the company.25 . The first purpose is accomplished through
the distinction drawn between a stock dividend and a stock split-up26
-a stock dividend is a distribution which increases the number of
shares previously outstanding by less than twenty-five per cent2 7 ; a
stock split-up is a distribution which increases the number of shares
previously outstanding by twenty-five per cent or more. 28 The second
purpose -is accomplished through the requirement that dividend
shares be capitalized on the basis of fair value, rather than par or
stated value.29 The net effect of these policies is to limit the term
25. American Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research Bull. No. 43,
at 51 (1953); New York Stock Exchange, Company Manual § A 13, at 235
(1955).
26. This distinction is drawn to treat stock distributions according to their
true nature and effect, irrespective of the designation assigned them by the
distributing corporation.
"The Term stock dividend . .. refers to an issuance . . . of . . . common

shares ... under conditions indicating that such action is prompted mainly
by a desire to give the recipient shareholders some ostensibly separate evidence of a part of their respective interests in accumulated corporate earnings
without distribution of cash or other property.
"The term stock split-up .

.

. refers to an issuance . . . of

.

. .

common

shares . . .under conditions indicating that such action is prompted mainly

by a desire to increase the number of outstanding shares for the purpose of
effecting a reduction in their unit market price and, thereby, of obtaining
wider distribution and improved marketability of the shares." American
Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research Bull. No. 43, at 49 (1953).
27. The term stock dividend is confined to those distributions which are
so small in comparison with the number of shares previously outstanding
that they have no apparent effect on the share market price. The point at
which the relative size of the distribution becomes large enough to materially
influence the market value of the stock has been set at 25% of the number of
shares previously outstanding. Id. at 51, 52. The New York Stock Exchange
has incorporated this 25% dividing line into its stock dividend listing policy:
"That stock dividend policy does not apply to a split-up or distribution
which increases, by 100% or more, the number of shares outstanding
immediately prior to the split-up or distribution. It does apply, however,
to a split-up or distribution which increases the number of shares theretofore outstanding by less than 25%, regardless of whether such increase
is effected through the technique of a stock dividend or that of a split-up,
and regardless of whether it is represented as a stock dividend or a
split-up.
"As to split-ups or distributions of 25% or more, but less than 100%,
the Exchange will require capitalization at fair value only when, in the
opinion of the Exchange, such distributions assume the character of
stock dividends through repetition under circumstances not inconsistent
with the true intent and purpose of stock split-ups." New York Stock Exchange, Company Manual § A 14 (1955).
28. The purpose of a stock split-up is to reduce the unit market price of
the stock, thus obtaining wider distribution and improved marketability of
the shares. This purpose normally cannot be accomplished by a stock distribution representing less than 25% of the previously outstanding shares. American Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research Bull. No. 43, at 52 (1953).
29. "The Exchange, in authorizing the listing of additional shares to be distributed pursuant to a stock dividend . . . will require that . . . there be

transferred from earned surplus to the permanent capitalization of the company ... an amount equal to the fair value of such shares. While it is impracticable to define 'fair value' exactly, it should closely approximate the current
share market price adjusted to reflect issuance of the additional shares."
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"stock dividend" to include only those distributions which represent
an increase of less than twenty-five per cent of the number of shares
previously outstanding, and which are composed of shares capitalized
at their fair value.
The court in the instant case refused to adopt this restricted concept of a stock dividend.30 In affirming the lower court's decision that
the number of shares whose par value was represented by the new
capital constituted a stock dividend, 31 the court adhered to the
broader traditional definition-that all distributions of stock which
capitalize surplus constitute stock dividends. 32 The primary problem
presented in this case was the construction of a deed of trust executed
in 1918.3 Refusing to deviate from the basic principle governing its
inquiry, that the settlor's intent as manifested in the trust instrument
must be effectuated, 34 the court addressed itself essentially to the task
of ascertaining the meaning of "stock dividend" as existent at the
time of its selection by the settlor.35 The policies of the New York
Stock Exchange and the American Institute of Accountants being
promulgated subsequent to the execution of the trust agreement,3
the court did not find it necessary to consider the merits of the
definitions contained therein. The intent of the settlor could not
be thwarted by an ex post facto change in the law governing stock
dividends.3 7 The court did note, however, that the definitions urged
by the beneficiaries might more nearly reflect the modern views of
New York Stock Exchange, Company Manual § A 13, at 235 (1955).

Using

the market value of the stock is in line with the doctrine of reinvestment.
See note 24 supra. Capitalization on the basis of fair value has been attacked
on two grounds: "(1) it is argued that if a stock dividend is not income to
the recipient, the issuing corporation should not base accounting procedures
upon the reaction of the recipient who may think otherwise; and (2) since
fair market price reflects both paid-in and accumulated capital, a transfer
between the two based upon fair market price fails to maintain the desired
distinction between the two capital elements." HOLMES, MAYNARD, EDWARDS
& MEIER, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUINTnG 622 (3d ed. 1958); see also PATON, AcCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 1017 (3d ed. 1943).
30. 4 N.Y.2d 645, 655, 152 N.E.2d 228, 233, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966, 973.
31. Id. at 653, 152 N.E. at 232, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
32. Ibid. See note 10 supra.
33. Id. at 650, 152 N.E.2d at 230, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 968. See note 2 supra.
34. Id. at 655, 152 N.E.2d at 233, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
35. The definition of "stock dividend," applied by the court in this case was
established in New York as early as 1883. Williams v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 93 N.Y. 162 (1883). Further, several stock dividends were paid
by General Electric and received by the settlor, Wood Fosdick, under the
special trust provision during his lifetime. Brief for Respondent, pp. 22, 23,
instant case.
36. American Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research Bull. No. 43
(1953); New York Stock Exchange, Company Manual §§ A 13, A 14 (1955).
37. "The terms of the trust are determined by the intention of the settlor
at the time of the creation of the trust .... ." 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 164.1, at 1159
(2d ed. 1956). Clearly, Fosdick must have intended to use the term "stock
dividend" in its traditional legal concept. See note 35 supra.
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economists and accountants, but concluded that a change in the legal
definition is a function for the legislature alone. 38
The argument advanced by the beneficiaries in this case represents
the first significant attempt to obtain a judicial alteration of the traditional definition of the term "stock dividend" in order to bring
that definition into conformity with the definitions used today by the
New York Stock Exchange and the American Institute of Accountants. It is unfortunate, however, that the argument should have been
made in a case in which the court's determination depended so clearly
on the manifested intent of the settlor rather than on the operation
of general rules determining the nature of stock dividends. Clearly,
the purpose of the corporate action in this case was not to pay a
dividend, but to increase the number of outstanding shares so that
more investors would be attracted by the reduced market price,39
and to establish a relatively low par value in order to minimize federal transfer taxes.40 The action coincided exactly with the transactions recommended by the New York Stock Exchange in its policies
to promote improved marketability of listed securities. 4 1 This case
illustrates the potential litigation that may develop in this area because the concept of stock dividends currently being applied by the
courts is inconsistent with the concepts prevailing in modern financial and accounting circles. This inconsistency should be remedied by
a change in the conventional legal definition to conform with present38. 4 N.Y.2d 645, 655, 152 N.E.2d 228, 233, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966, 973.
39. For the effect of relatively large stock distributions on market price
see note 28 supra.
40. At the time of the General Electric transaction the federal transfer tax
was based on the unit of $100 of par value. No-par shares were taxed at the
same rate as shares of $100 par value. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4321. A
change from no-par value to $5 par value per share reduced the transfer tax
on 100 shares whose selling price was $20 or more from $6 to thirty cents.
Under the present tax laws the transfer tax is based on "actual value," and
no distinction is made between par value shares and no-par value shares.
Thus, a tax benefit can no longer be gained by a change from no-par stock
to low par stock. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4321, as amended, 72 Stat. 1295
(1958).
41. "The Exchange is ... interested in any steps that can be taken to improve the quality of the market for a listed security ... therefore, it is sug-

gested that the management of any company having a stable record of
earnings, and a consistently high dollar-market-price for its stock, consider
the advantages which may be derived from a stock split-up through the
broadening of public ownership of the company's stock and possible improvement of the market." New York Stock Exchange, Company Manual § A 14
at 255-56 (1955).
"When a split-up is in contemplation, thought should be given also to the
possible desirability of a change of par value.
"Shares having a high par value, and shares having no par value, are at a
substantial disadvantage, from the standpoint of the Federal transfer tax on
securities transactions, as compared with shares having a low par value. A
stock split-up offers a logical and convenient opportunity to eliminate that
disadvantage ....
" Id. at 257-58.
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day corporate accounting and financing practices2-the nature of a
stock distribution should be determined by the substance and intent
of the corporate action judged in light of the practices and understanding of the financial community. The court in the principal case properly refused to remedy the inconsistency through judicial decision.
The change should be made by the legislature, which after investigation and consideration can, without being hampered by precedent, lay
down objective tests to guide lawyers, trustees and courts in the allocation of stock distributions.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE-STATUTORY
LIMITATION OF JENCKS DECISION
The defendant was indicted for willful evasion of his federal income
tax.1 An accountant who had helped defendant prepare his return
gave sworn testimony to tax agents prior to trial. Defendant requested
that this information be made available for possible impeachment
purposes. Under section 3500, a recent provision of Title 18 of the
United States Code, governing production of statements of this nature
in the hands of the Government,2 witness' signed testimony,3 a supplemental affidavit,4 and a copy of the accountant's grand jury testimony 5 were made available to the defendant. The Government,
however, refused to surrender a memorandum which an agent had
prepared summarizing an interview with the witness.6 Defendant
42. At one time the book value of shares bore a reasonable relation to the
market value, and the earnings of a corporation were almost wholly distributed to the shareholders, either in the form of cash dividends or in liquidation.
Present-day corporate financing practice "ploughs back" a large portion of
the earnings into the business and such earnings never will be distributed to
the shareholders. See dissenting opinion, instant case.
1. The applicable statute was INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 289, § 145 (b), 52
Stat. 513 making willful tax evasion a felony. This is now included in §§
7201-03 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.

2. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958). Hereafter in the text referred to as
§ 3500. For further amplification of this statute see notes 7 and 15 infra.

3. This consisted of testimony transcribed and then signed by the witness.
4. The affidavit was employed to make changes in the transcribed testi-

mony and was likewise signed by the witness.
5. This is definitely not an item which § 3500 requires to be handed over
to the defendant. In fact one of the reasons for enacting § 3500 was to

repudiate the holding in United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1957) which directed the production of grand jury testimony under authority
of the Jencks decision. "The committee rejects, therefore, any interpretation
of the Jencks decision which would provide for the production of entire
investigative files, grand jury testimony, or similar materials." U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1862 (1957).
6. The memorandum was prepared shortly after the interview relating to
the affidavit and indicated that the witness had responded to further question-
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argued that even though this memorandum did not come within the
specifications of section 3500, 7 it must be made available under the
authority of Jencks v. United States.8 The district court did not accept
this argument and defendant was convicted. On appeal, held, affirmed. Whether production of an informal memorandum, such as
here involved, would have been required under authority of the
Jencks decision need not be decided since section 3500, which clearly
excludes this matter, is now the exclusive procedural guide in federal
criminal proceedings. United States v. Palermo,258 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.
1958).
Prior to the Jencks decision a body of federal law had built up with
regard to documentary evidence in the hands of the Government
which must be made available to a defendant in a criminal prosecution.9 There was a decided lack of harmony among the circuits as to
the foundation upon which the right to such evidence was based as
well as to the application of that right.10 In June of 1957 the Supreme
Court entered the field for the first time in Jencks. The defendant
there was convicted of filing a false noncommunist affidavit. Two
government witnesses had been fellow communists with Jencks but
had regularly given reports to the FBI. It was held that the Government must produce these reports directly to the defendant without a
prior inspection by the judge and that this must be done even though
there was no prior showing of testimonial inconsistency." The reing. The memorandum was made part of the record on appeal as "Court's

Exhibit 2." 258 F.2d at 398 and n. 1.
7. The pertinent provision of the statute defines the word "statement" as
follows: "(1) A written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; or (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the
Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral
statement." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (Supp. V, 1958).
8. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
9. The Second Circuit has probably discussed this problem more frequently
and more articulately than the other circuits. Its procedure permits the judge
to inspect the testimony in camera and to hand over to defendant any material
capable of use for impeachment purposes. Cases in which this matter has
been discussed are: United States v. Angelet, 255 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1958);
United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Grayson,
166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.
1946); United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v.
Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d
76 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
10. It has been suggested that three major areas of difference existed among
the circuits: "(1) the basis for ordering disclosure, (2) the procedural requirements necessary to acquire an order for disclosure and (3) the extent
of the disclosure." Comment, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 110 (1957).
11. The lower court had held that the evidence need not be produced since
there had been no preliminary showing of an inconsistency between the testimony of the witness and the statements in the hands of the Government. The
Supreme Court reversed and directed dismissal of the action. "Requiring the
accused first to show conflict between the reports and the testimony is actually
to deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his defense. The occa-
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action to this decision came immediately and was uniformly unfavorable.1 2 Within three months numerous lower federal courts had
interpreted this decision in a variety of ways.' 3 The Congress, already
alarmed, was further spurred to prompt activity by these diverse
interpretations. This culminated in the passage of section 3500 in
early September, 1957. Congress desired to control the exposure of
government sources of information, particularly in areas where
security matters were concerned. Thus section 3500 provides that
information which the Government considers privileged will first be
submittekd to the judge to inspect in camera. If a portion of the information which the Government claims to be privileged is not relevant
to witness' testimony, then the judge may excise that portion and
direct the Government to hand over only the relevant portion.14 On the
other hand if the judge finds that all of the information is relevant
then he will direct its transmission to the defendant regardless of its
sensitive nature. Such procedure forces the Government to decide
whether to expose the information or to retain it and thereby lose
the testimony of the witness, facing a possible mistrial if the defendant
has been prejudiced.'5 Congress was also concerned that Jencks not
be used as a basis for so called "fishing expeditions" into government
files in the hope of turning up impeachment information. 16 This has
been met by a provision, involved in the instant case, limiting the
action to statements recorded "substantially verbatim" or statements
17
which have been signed or adopted by the witness.
Here, as in several other similar cases, an attempt was made to
induce the court to go beyond section 3500 on the ground that Jencks
sion for determining a conflict cannot arise until after the witness has testified and unless he admits conflict, as in Gordon, the accused is helpless to
know or discover conflict without inspecting the reports." 353 U.S. at 667-68.
12. The general feeling was that the Court had in effect opened the government files to inquisitive defendants and their attorneys. For an interesting
discussion of the public reaction see, Eagleton, A State Prosecutor Looks at
the Jencks Case, 4 ST. Louis U.L.J. 405 and n.2 (1957).
13. For a full discussion of divergent case history which led up to the enactment of § 3500 see, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1864-69
(1957).
14. "The committee is also of the opinion that the dezision as to relevance
must be made by the trial judge and not by the defendant or his attorney."
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1863 (1957).
15. "(d) If the United States elects not to comply.., the court shall strike
from the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless
the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require
that a mistrial be declared." 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958). This penalty
is less severe than that rendered in the Jencks case where failure to produce
the evidence resulted in dismissal of the action. 353 U.S. at 672.
16. This statement was first used in Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414
(1953) and quoted again in the Jencks case. It was the committee's opinion
that the Jencks decision when carefully studied does not entitle a defendant
"to rove at will through Government ifies." U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1864 (1957).

17. See note 7 supra.
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was founded upon due process considerations and must therefore
supersede inconsistent provisions of the statute. 18 The courts have
not as yet accepted this interpretation. Recent decisions have pointed
out that Jencks was based upon the power of the Supreme Court to
regulate procedural aspects of the lower federal courts and not upon
constitutional grounds. 19 The phrase in the Jencks case which has
caused the courts considerable difficulty is, "justice requires no less.120
This would tend to indicate an inherent right to such evidence rather
than mere procedural policy. However, in the remainder of Jencks,
the Court did not speak in such terms, and no cases were cited which
would indicate that the decision turned on constitutional grounds.
Another item which has given the courts pause is the declaration by
the congressional committee that section 3500 was not intended to
curtail or abrogate the due process aspects of the Jencks decision. 21
In the instant case the court does not reach the direct question of
whether there is a conflict between section 3500 and Jencks since the
court concludes that if any such conflict existed it must be resolved
in favor of the legislation. 22
The present holding seems consistent with congressional intent,23
and should the Supreme Court grant certiorari, affirmance is likely.
The excluded material clearly did not come within the scope of the
statute and the appeal was not squarely based upon constitutional
grounds.24 It cannot definitely be said that an opposite result would
18. United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958) (§ 3500 not
unconstitutional in not applying Jencks decision to grand jury minutes);
United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (involving
inter-office memorandum). See also United States v. De Lucia, 27 U.S.L.
Week 2319 (7th Cir. Dec. 31, 1958) (quoting with approval the Spangelet
decision).
19. "The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, practice, and procedure. ...
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1952).
20. 353 U.S. at 669.
21. "The proposed legislation is not designed to nullify, or to curb, or to
limit the decision of the Supreme Court insofar as due process is concerned."
U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1862 (1957).
22. "We hold that the legislation is the exclusive standard in this field and
controls the procedure to be followed in such cases." 258 F.2d at 400.
23. "It is the specific intent of the bill to provide for the production only of
written statements previously made by a Government witness in the possession of the United States which are signed by him or otherwise adopted or
approved by him, and transcriptions or recordings of oral statements made
by the witness to a Federal law officer, relating to the matter as to which the
witness has testified." U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1862
(1957).
Since the chief aspect of § 3500 is to permit the impeachment of witnesses,
statements within the statute must be witness' own statements not what
someone else at a later time thought was said.
24. A specific provision of the Constitution was not designated as having
been abrogated by a denial of the evidence. It was merely claimed that § 3500
could not be used to deny the testimony since defendant was "entitled to have
it produced" under the Jencks decision. 258 F.2d at 399.
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have been reached under Jencks alone since in that case the evidence
in question appears to have either been written by the witness or
recorded contemporaneously by the FBI.2 Thus that case does not of
itself stand for the proposition that subsequent memoranda, as here
involved, must be made available to the defense. The interesting case
is yet to arise where excluded evidence definitely of impeachment
value is refused because not signed, acknowledged, or recorded verbatim in accord with section 3500.26 At that time, with the constitutional issue properly raised, the courts will have to face directly the
question of whether the sixth amendment 2 7 or the due process clause
of the fifth amendment 28 guarantees the production of such information in criminal cases.
25. "Petitioner was entitled to an order directing the Government to produce for inspection all reports of Matusow and Ford in its possession, written
and, when orally made, as recorded by the F.B.I.. . ." 353 U.S. at 668. The reports "writtin" by the witness would clearly come within § 3500. Furthermore, oral reports "as recorded by the F.B.I." would seem to indicate a contemporaneous recording. It is unlikely that a regular report from a counterespionage agent would be left to faulty memory and subsequent recordation.
26. The constitutionality of § 3500 might also be challenged on the ground
that a prior inspection of the testimony by the judge in camera rather than
handing over the evidence directly to the defendant is a violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The Jencks decision indicated that
"justice requires no less." 353 U.S. at 669. However there appear sound reasons why such a challenge will not be successful. The statute provides for
the preservation of any excised testimony so that it may be challenged directly
upon appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (c) (Supp. V, 1958). This would seem to satisfy
due process objections. A further reason for upholding the statute is the fact
that this type of inspection has become accepted procedure where grand
jury testimony is involved. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
H.J.K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Alper, 156
F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946). However grand jury testimony is considered in some
respects confidential information which would distinguish it from ordinary
testimony in the hands of the Government. "This secrecy is indispensable if
the Grand Jury is to be assured that witnesses called to testify before it are
testifying fully and freely, without fear that their testimony will expose them
to unwanted publicity, obloquy or intimidation. This secrecy is indispensable
if innocent persons, not indicted by the Grand Jury, are to be protected."
United States v. Consoldiated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). However it has been suggested that the need for such protection of
grand jury testimony is removed once the witness takes the stand upon trial.
8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2362 (3d ed. 1940). The opposing view holds that the
need continues until it is shown that the grand jury testimony can be of use
in testing the evidence presented on trial. 159 F. Supp. at 866. Some courts
have gone to extended length to deny a defendant the use of grand jury
minutes. There appears to have been no constitutional violation in SoconyVacuum where such minutes were employed to refresh the memory of government witnesses, but upon inspection by the judge these same minutes were
denied the defendant for impeachment purposes. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. "The court's discretionary power to compel production of a document in the custody of a government agency must be exercised in the light of the Sixth Amendment that: 'In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ... '" United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp.
731, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V. As already indicated the committee that drafted
§ 3500 felt that due process considerations might well be involved in the
Jencks case. See note 21 supra.
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EVIDENCE-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-INADMISSIBILITY IN
FEDERAL COURT OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH
AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH BY STATE OFFICERS
The defendant was convicted of housebreaking and larceny on
evidence obtained in the following manner: A Maryland motel keeper
became suspicious of the defendant and another man to whom he had
rented a cabin' and notified the state police. The police proceeded to
the cabin, knocked, confronted the occupant with a shotgun, and
entered. Upon entering, they recognized the occupant as a person
having a criminal record and who was then sought by his bondsman
for delinquency in paying a bond premium. The man was immediately
arrested, the grounds for the arrest not being clear, and a search was
conducted of the cabin and the adjoining room occupied by the
defendant. A quantity of money was found in and under the defendant's bed. It was not until hours later that the police learned of the
crime of which the defendant was accused. The federal district court
refused defendant's motion to exclude the money from evidence.
On appeal, held, reversed. Evidence obtained by state officers through
a search which violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment is inadmissible in a federal court even though the search
is conducted without the involvement of federal authorities. Hanna
v. Unifed States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
At common law, the illegality of the means by which evidence was
m2 In
obtained provided no ground of objection to its admission.
a majority of states the common law doctrine still prevails, but in Weeks
v. United States,3 decided in 1914, the Supreme Court of the United
States took a different stand. There the Court held that evidence
gained through violation of the fourth amendment, a constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable search and seizure, was inadmissible
in a federal court provided a timely pretrial motion to suppress such
evidence was made.4 The reasoning behind the federal exclusionary
rule thus adopted was that it provided the only effective way to prevent violations of the fourth amendment by federal authorities.5 The
1. At an early morning hour one of the men had rented a cabin with an
adjoining room, ostensibly for his invalid wife. The motel keeper became
suspicious when he failed to see a woman and instead saw the man who
rented the cabin and another man (the defendant) enter the cabin carrying
what appeared to be a money bag. Upon looking through a window he
observed the two men counting a quantity of money.
2. MCCORMuCK, EVIDENCE § 137 (1954).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. McCoRamcK, EVIDENCE § 139 (1954). At the present time, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure broaden the provision of the requirement of a
pretrial motion. FED. R. Canvw. P. 41 (e).
5. 232 U.S. at 393. For an extensive criticism of the exclusionary rule, see
8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
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Weeks case pointed out that the exclusionary rule was not binding
upon the states, however, because the fourth amendment was not
applicable to them. This part of the Weeks case was later modified
by Wolf v. Colorado 6 where the Court held that the fourth amendment was applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment; but due process did not necessarily require the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained by state officers.
The Court indicated in the Wolf case that as long as a state provided
some remedy 7 against an illegal search and seizure, due process
would not be denied by the admission of evidence illegally obtained.
Since Wolf, however, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to
determine the admissibility in federal courts of evidence obtained
through unreasonable search and seizures by state officers. 8
Rather than following the reasoning of other federal circuit courts
in similar cases, 9 the decision here was drawn from impressions voiced
by individual members of the Supreme Court indicating that any
evidence procured by officers in violation of a constitutional right
should be excluded. 10 The court thus anticipates what the Supreme
Court holding would be, and indicates that that Court would probably
find the extension of the exclusionary rule necessary to the maintainence of judicial integrity." The court failed to recognize implications previously found by other federal courts in Lustig v. United
6. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7. Provisions against illegal search and seizure are found in almost every
state. CORNELIUs, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2 n.14 (2d ed. 1930). However, the
exclusionary rule has been adopted in only about two-fifths of the states.
McCoRmVIICK, EVIDENCE § 139 (1954).
8. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 n.10 (1957). Before the
Wolf decision evidence unlawfully obtained by state officers was freely admitted. E.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Shelton v. United
States, 169 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 834 (1948). Even
since the Wolf decision, however, some federal courts have continued to hold
that the United States Constitution does not prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures by state officers and thus have continued to follow the Weeks
doctrine. See, e.g., Gallegos v. United States, 237 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1956);
United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956); Serio v. United States,
203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
9. See Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1958); Jones v. United
States, 217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954); Fredericks v. United States, 208 F.2d 712
(5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S: 1019 (1954); Parker v. United States,
183 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1950); Losieau v. United States, 177 F.2d 919 (8th Cir.
1949).
10. See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214,
(1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 218
(1954) (Clark, J., concurring);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 80 (1949) (Burton, J., dissenting). See
also the decisions merely indicating that the question remained open. Benanti
v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 n.10 (1957) (Warren, C. J.); Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.).
11. 260 F.2d at 728. The concern with the integrity of the judicial process
appears to be a departure from the ordinary concept that the exclusionary
rule was created solely for the judicial enforcement of the fourth amendment
in the federal sphere.
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States12 to the effect that evidence illegally obtained by state officers
without federal participation might be admissible. Instead, the court
cites the Lustig case as merely indicating that the admissibility of
13
In extending the exclusuch evidence remained an open question.
since the fourth amendthat
position
sionary rule the court takes the
ment is applicable to the states through the due process clause,
constitutional rights would be no less infringed when illegally
obtained evidence is presented in a federal court by a state officer
than when it is introduced by a federal officer. In so concluding the
court recognizes that in addition to preserving judicial integrity state
to constitutional
officers may be effectively persuaded to conform
14
methods and procedures in obtaining evidence.
In effect, the decision weighs the preservation of judicial integrity
and the enforcement of constitutional rights against the strict enforcement of federal criminal law and the encroachment upon the sphere
of state law enforcement agencies. Since the exclusionary rule already
5
prevents the strict enforcement of federal criminal law, the further
subjection of such enforcement by the extension reached here does
not appear alarming. However, the encroachment upon the activities
0
of state law enforcement agencies presents a different question.' The
decision tends to regulate state authorities in the enforcement of
federal law, but does not, however, impose any restrictions on the
state's enforcement of its own criminal laws, as the state remains free
to decide the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in its own
courts. Since only the enforcement of federal law is involved, such
regulation does not present an appreciable interference with state
agencies.17 Should this decision be adopted by the United States
12. 338 U.S. 74 (1949). The Lustig case established the "silver platter"
doctrine which implied that evidence obtained by state officers through an
unreasonable search could be turned over to federal authorities on a "silver
platter" as long as federal authorities had not participated in any way
in the search or instigation of the search. See also Gambino v. United States,
275 U.S. 310 (1927), where the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained
by state officers was made dependant upon the intent of the officers at the
time of the search.
13. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
14. 260 F.2d at 728.
15. '"That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty
persons is more capable of demonstration than that it deters invasions of
right by police." Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
16. A similar problem was encountered in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S.
214 (1956), where the Supreme Court enjoined a state court from admitting
evidence gained through an unreasonable search by federal officers. The interference imposed on the state by the instant decision would appear to be less
than that imposed by the Rea case.
17. The decision, at any rate, remedies the anomalous result previously
reached whereby evidence illegally obtained by state officers was admissible
in federal courts under the "silver platter" doctrine even though both the
state in which the evidence was obtained and the federal court employed
the exclusionary rule. For a discussion of this odd situation, see Parsons,
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Supreme Court there would remain yet another field into which the
exclusionary rule might be extended: that of exclusion of evidence
gained through unreasonable searches and seizures by private citizens. 18 Whether the preservation of judicial integrity would serve
as a basis for an extension of the rule in that situation is doubtful.

EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-ABILITY OF ONE SPOUSE TO
TESTIFY AGAINST THE OTHER IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner was convicted in a federal district court for transporting
a girl from Arkansas to Oklahoma for immoral purposes.' At the
trial petitioner's wife was permitted to testify for the prosecution.
In affirming, the court of appeals2 held there was no error in the admission of the wife's testimony against petitioner. On certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. Absent the
consent of both husband and wife, the public interest in preserving
domestic peace requires the exclusion of the testimony of one spouse
against the other in federal criminal proceedings. 3 Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
At common law one could not testify for or against his spouse 4
except in cases involving corporal violence committed by one upon
the other.5 The danger of falsification due to pecuniary interest and
marital bias,6 and the public interest in preserving domestic peace 7
State-Federal Crossfire In Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination, 42

CORNELL L.Q. 346, 362 (1957).
18. At the present time evidence obtained illegally by private citizens is
readily admissible. See, e.g., McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927);
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). Cf. Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
1. The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
2. 249 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1957).
3. The Court also decided that the error in admitting the evidence was
prejudicial to petitioner.
4. 1 CoxE, COmMENTARY upON LiTTLETON, ch. 1, § 1,

(6b)

(h) (19th ed.

1853).
5. 8 WIGMORE, EVDENCE § 2239 (3d ed. 1940). In the federal courts the exception has been broadened to include torts and moral wrongs inflicted. See,
e.g., Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); Hayes v. United
States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Kerr v. United States, 11 F.2d 227 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 689 (1926); Denning v. United States, 247 Fed. 463
(5th Cir. 1918). In the Shores case it was said that a wife may be compelled
to testify under the exception. This position was taken in a holding subsequent to the principal case. Wyatt v. United States, 263 F.2d 304 (5th Cir.
1959).
6. 2 WIGMOPE, EVIDENCE § 601 (3d ed. 1940).
7. 8 Id. § 2227.
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were the principal reasons given in support of the exclusion. Since
none of the dangers involved in the former reason were applicable if
one spouse testified against the other, it has been insisted that the exclusion of adverse testimony was based on a privilege of each not to
testify against the other and not to be testified against by the other.8
The early cases, however, spoke in terms of an absolute disqualification when referring to either type testimony,9 and this was the view
taken by the Supreme Court when it adopted the common law rule.10
In the states the rule has been subject to extensive changes," but
2
state rules of competency did not affect federal criminal proceedings'
where the competency of witnesses was determined by the common
law as it existed in the states in 178913 or at the time of entry of a
subsequently admitted state.14 But in 1933 the Court in Funk v.
United States,15 refusing to adhere to law antiquated by changed conditions and modern thought, 16 abolished that part of the rule excluding
testimony given for a spouse. Soon thereafter a tenth circuit decision
went further, holding a spouse competent to testify against the other
where confidential communications were not involved.17 Although
one circuit has approved, 18 others have refused to follow the lead.19
In the present case the Court, examining the exclusionary rule in
the light of "reason and experience," 20 rejected the position taken by
the tenth circuit. Distinguishing the Funk case, the Court concluded
that the basic reason supporting the rule, the preservation of family
8. Id. §§ 2227-29.

9. Shenton v. Tyler, [1939] Ch. 620, reviews the authorities and concludes
that testimony offered against a spouse was excluded on the grounds of incompetency, not on that of privilege.
10. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839). Later cases have spoken

of this aspect of the rule as a double privilege See, e.g., United States v.
Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir.), ajfd on rehearing, 138 F.2d 831 (2d

Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944); Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed.
23, 29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 696 (1914).
11. The statutes are collected in 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed. 1940).

12. In 1862 Congress enacted that "the laws of the State in which the court
shall be held shall be the rules of decision as to competency of witnesses in the
courts of the United States, in trials at common law, in equity, and in admirality." 12 Stat. 588 (1862). In Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892), "trials
at common law" was construed as not including criminal actions.
13. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
14. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
15. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
16. Common law rules of evidence are now applied in the light of "reason
and experience." FED. R. C~iv. P. 26.

17. Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935). That a separate

and distinct privilege protecting confidential communications between spouses
existed at common law, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2333 (3d ed. 1940). But
see Shenton v. Tyler, note 9 supra.
18. United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748, 761 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 344
U.S. 809 (1952), aff'd, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
19. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.

891 (1949); Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948); Paul v.
United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935).
20. See note 16 supra.
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harmony, had not been undermined by time or changing legal practices. The Government argued that while this reason might be valid
in respect to compelled testimony, it fails where the spouse volunteers,
because of the strong likelihood in such case that no domestic interest
is left to be preserved. The Court refused to recognize this distinction
and held that the rule creates a privilege in both husbaiid and wife.
The reasoning was that it should not be the policy of the law to force
or encourage testimony which would disrupt marital harmony. This,
of course, rests upon the assumption that adverse testimony given by
a spouse in criminal proceedings would disrupt marital harmony.
The value which the Court places upon the protection of domestic
tranquillity at the sacrifice of individual justice has been severely
criticized. 21 It has been noted that since modern developments have
wrought significant changes in the old family relationships, this is a
sacrifice made to a concept which no longer merits it. 2 2 Yet the basic
assumption of the Court is that under present conditions the modern
family justifies the continuation of the rule. While it is quite apparent
how unrealistic this assumption may be in a particular case,23 it is
equally apparent that all the data necessary for an intelligent determination of the rule's effect under moderm conditions should be collected and studied. This task could be performed by a body such as
that proposed at the Circuit Judicial Conferences. 24 In the absence of
legislation based upon the findings and recommendations of such a
body, the opinion of the Court, reversing a previously liberal trend
toward the admission of a spouse's testimony, is unlikely to be
changed in the near future.

HABEAS CORPUS-FEDERAL COURT REMAND OF
PETITIONER TO STATE COURT FOR NEW TRIAL
Petitioner was convicted and imprisoned for armed robbery. On
appeal and on denial of his state petition for a post-conviction hearing
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States.1 He
21.

See 7 BENTHAM,

RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EvIDENCE 480-86

(Bowring ed.

1843).
22. Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-

Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929).

23. See United States v. Walker, note 19 supra, (dissenting opinion).

24. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 43 (1957).

1. Petitioner was first denied certiorari on his appeal in Westbrook v. Ragen,
337 U.S. 960 (1949) and again on denial of his petition for a post-conviction
hearing in Westbrook v. People, 349 U.S. 957 (1955).
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then sought release on a writ of habeas corpus in the state courts, and
certiorari was again denied.2 Discharge on a writ of habeas corpus in
the federal district court was then sought, petitioner alleging a denial
of due process in that he was unable to obtain a transcript of the
record 3 for use in perfecting his appeal. The district court discharged
petitioner from custody. On appeal to the court of appeals, held,
reversed with special instructions. On a petition for habeas corpus
by a state prisoner, a federal court may remand petitioner to the
state court, instructing the latter to grant a new trial, with the provision that the failure to comply within six months will result in
petitioner's final discharge. United States v. Randolph, 259 F.2d 215
(7th Cir. 1958).
The writ of habeas corpus is recognized by the Federal Constitution,4 having been brought to this country as a part of the common
law,5 but the power of the federal courts to issue the writ is statutory.6
From the original grant of power to issue the writ 7 and its limitation
to the writ ad testificandum in cases of state prisoners, this power
has been broadened until today the federal courts can issue the writ
in all cases of restraint of liberty in violation of the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States.9 Under the present code the
court is "to dispose of the party as law and justice require,"'10 but this
provision does not deny the federal courts the use of discretion as to
time and mode of issuance of the writ," with proper regard to state
sovereignty.' 2 The original notion was that the writ was available
only for discharge or remanding to custody or bail. 13 It is not avail2. Cert. denied, Westbrook v. Randolph, 352 U.S. 973 (1957).
3. Petitioner was unable to obtain a transcript of the record due to the

illness of the court reporter.

4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it." This is the only mention of the writ of habeas corpus in the
constitution.
5. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868). See also 25 AM. Jun.
Habeas Corpus § 3 (1947).

6. Whitney v. Dick, 202 U.S. 132, 134 (1906); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4

Cranch) 75,93 (1807).

7. The federal courts were first given the power to issue the writ in the
Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
8. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 590 (1890); Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
104, 105 (1845).

9. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385, U.S. Rev. St. § 753; Carfer v. Caldwell,

200 U.S. 293, 296 (1906); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 239 (1895); Cross

v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82, 86 (1892). Legislation concerning habeas corpus is now
embodied in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1952).
10. 1948 Revised Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1952).
11. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 240 (1895); New York v. Eno, 155
U.S. 89, 94 (1894); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886). See also 25 AM.
JuR. Habeas Corpus § 132 (1947).
12. See discussion of this point in Johnson v. Wilson, 131 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1942).

13. See 25 Amv. JuR. Habeas Corpus § 152 (1947); 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus

§ 102 (1950).
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able as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error 4 and it follows that
it should not be used to grant a new trial, but little authority can be
found for this proposition.15 Provisional orders of discharge, however,
have been issued wherein the trial court is advised that if the errors
rendering the discharge necessary are not corrected within a fixed or
reasonable time the petitioner will be discharged, 16 any corrective
action being left to the discretion of the trial court. Only one case
has been found, United States v. McCorkle,17 where a new trial without provisos was granted a state prisoner, apparently purporting to
leave the state court no alternative.
The court in the instant case did not cite McCorkle but, in directing
the district court to instruct the state court to grant petitioner a new
trial, relied on a line of cases culminating in Chessman v. Teets 8 and
Mahler v. Eby.19 In none of the decisions cited was the petitioner
remanded to the state court with instructions that it grant a new
trial. Chessman went further in this direction than any of the other
cases relied on, but there the order was simply to "allow California
a reasonable time in which to take further proceedings... ."20 Mahler
involved a federal administrative action, not a state proceeding, and
even there the order was for a provisional discharge. 21 Only three of
the remaining cases in this line of authority concerned state prisoners2 2 and in none of them did the court grant a new trial. These
14. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 138 (1934); Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U.S. 146,
15. "Also, the habeas corpus court cannot grant a new trial, which is the

148 (1908); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 548 (1905).

just remedy for errors. . . ." Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 697 (1941) (involving a court-martial conviction).

Apparently the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used to grant a new

trial is so well settled that there is scant authority for it.
16. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957); Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S.
206 (1951) ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 46 (1924).
17. 248 F.2d 1, 9 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). Here
petitioner was convicted of first degree murder during an armed robbery
and sought release because one of the jurors had been a recent victim of an
armed robbery. Since the error went only to the sentence, which might have
been life imprisonment instead of death, the court granted a new trial. This
trial was to be limited to the sentence, if possible under state procedure;
otherwise petitioner was granted a new trial generally. The court cited no
authority in granting the new trial.
18. "The task of affording petitioner a further review of his conviction
upon a properly settled record is necessarily one for the state courts." 354 U.S.
156, 165 (1957).
19. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).

20. 354 U.S. 156, 166 (1957).

21. Here the district court was ordered not to order the discharge of
petitioners until the Secretary of Labor had been allowed sufficient time to
make corrections in his findings or to institute new proceedings against them.
22. Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S.
160 (1890); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878). Dowd involved a
murder conviction in a state court wherein petitioner's appeal papers were
suppressed, a release was ordered provisional on the correction of the defects
rendering discharge necessary. Medley concerned a prisoner who was convicted under an ex post facto law changing the punishment for murder; the
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cases are factually a heterogenous lot,23 involving a variety of orders
under peculiar circumstances. They are illustrative of the manner in
which the relief granted in federal habeas corpus proceedings has
been broadened but they do not contain authority for granting a new
trial.
At first glance the difference between the holding here and in the
Chessman case seems to be only a matter of words. In Chessman the
warden was ordered to discharge petitioner after a reasonable time if
the errors had not been corrected. 24 Here the state court was ordered
to grant petitioner a new trial failing which he should be discharged.2
In Chessman the order was properly to the restraining party but in
the instant case the order was to the state court.2 Apparently Medley,
Petitioner2 7 gave birth to the authority relied on for granting a provisional discharge. No doubt the use of the order arose from the
feeling that even though constitutional guarantees of a fair trial
must not vitiated in any degree, neither should an obviously guilty
party whose constitutional rights have been violated be returned to
society without allowing the state or trial court an opportunity to
correct its errors. Thinking it necessary to accomplish both these
results, the courts have turned to the provisional discharge. Though
the difference between the order in Chessman and in the present case
might appear to be one of words and though the effect might well be
the same, that is, discharge if the errors are not corrected, there are
significant differences. The order in Randolph directing the state
court to grant a new trial, as opposed to an order to the warden to
discharge after a reasonable time if the errors are not corrected, lends
itself to the omission of the proviso which would, in effect, amount to
the use of the writ of habeas corpus as a writ of error.
warden was ordered to notify state authorities of the date and hour of discharge ten days previous. In Coleman, petitioner was convicted of murder
and sentenced by a military court but the sentence was not carried out. Later
Tennessee convicted him for murder and the habeas corpus court ordered him
discharged and turned over to the military authorities.
23. See note 22 supra. Other cases included Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113
(1924) (an action by the immigration authorities); In re Bonner, 151 U.S.
242 (1894) (after federal court conviction and erroneous sentencing to a
state penitentary, petitioner was turned over to the federal court in order that
they might correct the sentence in so far as the place of confinement was
concerned); United States v. McBrantney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (a conviction
under federal law and by a federal court without authority wherein the
prisoner was placed in the custody of the state having jurisdiction); Bryant
v. United States, 214 Fed. 51 (8th Cir. 1914) (petitioner was remanded to the
federal court of conviction for proper sentencing).
24. 354 U.S. 156, 166 (1957).
25. 259 F.2d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1958).
26. Ibid.

27. 134 U.S. 160 (1890). See note 22 supra.
28. Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1940), cert denied, 312
U.S. 697 (1941).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TORT LIABILITY-DUTY TO
PROVIDE POLICE PROTECTION TO INFORMERS
In response to an FBI flyer, Arnold L. Schuster supplied the New
York City Police Department with information leading to the arrest
of the wanted criminal, Willie "The Actor" Sutton. After Schuster's
part in the capture was widely publicized he received several communications, allegedly from Sutton's cohorts, threatening his life,
and consequently requested police protection. Although provided,
such protection was withdrawn after a short time, against the demands
of Schuster. Nineteen days after Schuster had supplied the requested
information he was shot and killed by an unknown assailant.' In an
action for wrongful death by Schuster's administrator against the
city for negligence of the police in failing to provide necessary protection, the complaint was dismissed for legal insufficiency. On
appeal,2 held, reversed. A municipality is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care for the protection of persons who have collaborated
with it in the arrest or prosecution of criminals if it reasonably appears that they are in danger as a result of this collaboration.
Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
The instant case could not have arisen in any state which had not
waived its sovereign immunity 3 and extended such waiver to municipalities 4 acting in their governmental capacities. Where this immunity
has been waived, there still remains the problem of determining the
extent of substantive responsibility of the municipality. 5 In attempting to solve this problem, New York courts have had little trouble in
finding municipalities liable for the misfeasance or malfeasance of
their public servants 6 but have not entirely settled the question of
liability for failure to act or to provide certain benefits. 7 In some
1. For details of the murder, see New York Times, Mar. 9, 1953, p. 1, Col. 8.
2. The Appellate Division had affirmed the trial court, Schuster v. City of
New York, 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1955).
3. Court of Claims Act, N. Y. Laws c. 860 § 8 (1939). For a survey of the
status of state tort liability, see Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the
States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363 (1954).

4. Bernardine v. New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).

See also

Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability In New York, 23 N.Y.U.L. REV. 278 (1948).
See generally, 18 McQumLAN, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 53 (3d ed. 1950).

5. Gardner, An Inquiry Into Principles of Municipal Responsibility In General Assumpsit and Tort, 8 V.A-D. L. REv. 753, 772 (1955).
6. See, e.g., Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 455, 151 N.E.2d 861,
176 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1958); O'Grady v. City of Fulton, 4 N.Y.2d 717, 148 N.E.2d
317, 171 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1958); Flamer v. City of Yonkers, 309 N.Y. 114, 127
N.E.2d 838 (1955); Wilkes v. City of New York, 308 N.Y. 726, 124 N.E.2d 338
(1954); Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952);
Adamo v. P.G. Motor Freight, Inc., 4 App. Div. 2d 758, 164 N.Y.S.2d 874
(1957); Benway v. City of Watertown, 1 App. Div. 2d 465, 151 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1956).
7. Gardner, An Inquiry Into Principles of Municipal Responsibility In General Assumpsit and Tort, 8 V~m .L. REV. 753, 773 (1955).
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cases,8 liability for non-action has been negatived by finding that
there was no duty on the part of the municipality extending to the
individual seeking recovery. Such a finding is based upon the premise
that the duty of a municipality to act extends to the public as a
whole, and to extend it to each individual would place an impossible
burden upon the municipal government. Thus, municipalities have
been relieved of liability for failure of their fire departments to provide necessary water pressure 9 or adequately maintain equipment, 0
and for failure of their police departments to provide adequate protection. 1 Under this reasoning, it became necessary to find an express
duty extending to Schuster.
The court found a duty on the part of the city stemming from two
sources: (1) A duty of police protection arising in return from a
citizen's duty to inform; (2) A duty to "go forward" or continue an
undertaking once started if failure to do so would leave the plaintiff
in a worse or aggravated position. In support of the first proposition
the court cited a decision of the United States Supreme Court, In re
Quarles, 12 as envisaging a duty on the part of a citizen to inform and
also as contemplating that the government owed the informer a
duty of protection. This reciprocal duty finds further foundation in
the policy implied in section 1848 of the New York Penal Law 3 which,
although inapplicable here, was cited as indicating the Legislature's
desire that the government be liable for "care and solicitude for the
private citizen who cooperates with public authorities in the arrest
and prosecution of criminals."' 4 As for the second proposition, the
8. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945); Moch Co. v.

Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 288 (1934).
9. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). See
also PROSSER, TORTS § 85 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 348 (1946).
10. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945). See also 18
MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.53 (3d ed. 1950).
11. Murrain v. Wilson Line, 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947). For a general
outline of the duties of the New York police, see NEW YoRK CITY CHARTER §
435 (1938).
12. 158 U.S. 532 (1894) (government owes a duty of protection to a private
citizen who exercises or has exercised his right to report law violations). See
also, Ex re Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). Cf. Worthington v. Scribner, 109
Mass. 487, 12 Am. Rep. 736 (1872).
13. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1848. The law provides in part:
"A person, who after having been lawfully commanded to aid an officer
in arresting any person,... wilfully neglects or refuses to aid such officer
is guilty of a misdemeanor. Where such a command is obeyed and the
person obeying it is killed . . . and such death . . . arises out of and in
the course of aiding an officer in arresting or endeavoring to arrest a
person,... the personal representatives of the person so killed shall have
a cause of action to recover the amount of such damage . . . against the
municipal corporation by which such officer is employed at the time such
command is obeyed."
14. 180 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
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court relied upon an earlier New York opinion' 5 of Judge Cardozo
imposing a duty to "go forward," once having started, if failure to do
so would be an active element in causing injury. The court indicated
that failure to provide Schuster with protection was more than a
mere withholding of a benefit, for by seeking information the police
had "started forward" and had induced Schuster to put himself in
an irretrievable and dangerous position. Thereafter, an obligation,
arose to use due care to protect the responding informer once he
reasonably appeared to be endangered. Non-performance of this obligation constituted a breach of duty.
Although finding a special duty extending to informers, the case
requires only that the police use reasonable care in determining the
necessity of special protection for such persons. The police are not
insurers of the informer's life and are liable only if they fail to exercise sound judgment in withholding protection. 16 Since there are few
murders or assaults on witnesses and informers resulting from their
collaboration with the authorities, 7 it is unlikely that special protection would "reasonably appear necessary" in many cases, and therefore the cost of special protection would not impose an unreasonable
burden. The decision reached satisfies an innate sense of justice and,
in effect, will probably do more to encourage cooperation betweer
citizens and law enforcement authorities in the capture of criminals
than offers of high rewards. Although applicable only in New York,
the decision will probably be of greater importance if the current
trend of increasing municipal tort liabilities 18 continues.

TAXATION-ESTATE TREASURY REGULATIONS
ON GOVERNMENT SAVINGS BONDS AS
AFFECTING FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Decedent's executors sought to recover estate taxes paid on Series
E government bonds which had been issued to decedent as co-owner,
15. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). The
rule as expressed by Chief Judge Cardozo states that "[I]f conduct has gone
forward to such a state that inaction would commonly result, not negatively
merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an
injury, there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward."
16. Some factors used in determining the necessity of protection would
probably be (1) Whether actual threats have been made, (2) The nature of
crimes previously committed by the apprehended criminal, (3) Type of
individuals and cohorts the criminal has been associated with, and (4)
Whether the criminal is known or suspected of being connected with an
underworld syndicate or gang.
17. This "well known" fact is pointed out in the dissenting opinion of
Conway, Ch. J., 180 N.Y.S. 2d at 278.
18. A trend in increasing tort liabilities of municipalities is noted in PROSSER,
TORTS § 109 (2d ed. 1955).
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contending that an inter vivos gift of the bonds by decedent had removed them from his gross estate.' The Commissioner included these
'bonds in decedent's estate relying on the applicable Treasury regulations2 which preclude an effective inter vivos transfer of bonds
without a reissuance in the name of the donees. Decedent had executed the inter vivos transfer without such a reissuance. The United
States District Court gave judgment for the Commissioner. On appeal,
held, reversed. The Treasury regulations applicable to government
savings bonds pertain only to relations between the government and
the holder of record and do not create property rights; it is state property law that determines whether such bonds are within an estate for
purposes of the federal estate tax. Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d
731 (3rd Cir. 1958).
The Treasury regulations issued pursuant to the amended Second
Liberty Bond Act,3 have been the source of judicial conflict concerning property rights in Government Savings Bonds. It is generally
agreed that the act authorizing the issuance of the bonds and the
regulations pursuant thereto are part of the contract 4 between the
Government and the bondholder, and are to be read into the contract
with the force and effect of federal law.5 From this generallyaccepted interpretation, there have emerged two conflicting views
regarding the property rights in the bonds. The majority of the
courts have interpreted the regulations as creating property rights6
which are governed by federal law, to take precedence over state
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(e), 53 Stat. 122 (now INT. REV. CODE
1954, § 2040).
2. 31 C.F.R. §§ 315.2, 315.11, 315.13 (1949).
3. 49 Stat. 21 (1935), 31 U.S.C. § 757C (1952). "This section confers very
broad powers on the Secretary of the Treasury, authorizing him to issue
Savings bonds in such manner and subject to such terms and conditions as
he may prescribe." Jones, United States Savings Bonds, Series E, F, and G,
11 MD. L. REv. 262, 263 (1950).
4. Ex parte Little, 259 Ala. 532, 67 So. 2d 818 (1947); Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Tezyk, 140 N.J.Eq. 474, 55 A.2d 26 (1947); In re Christie's Estate, 130
N.Y.S.2d 650 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
5. In reference to the terms of a national service life insurance policy issued
by the United States Government, the court stated: "The terms of this insurance contract, and the rights and liabilities of the parties are fixed by the
National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 801 et. seq.,
and the authorized administrative regulations promulgated in conformity
-with the Act, have the force and effect of federal law.. . ." Jones v. United
States, 189 F.2d 601, 602 (8th Cir. 1951). For cases in accord with this reasoning in reference to government savings bonds, see United States v. Sacks,
257 U.S. 37 (1921); United States v. Janowitz, 257 U.S. 42 (1921); Maryland
,Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920); United States v. Birdsall,
233 U.S. 223 (1914).
6. For cases holding that the rights of the parties depend entirely on the
terms of the bonds and the regulations governing them, see Chambless v.
Black, 250 Ala. 604, 35 So. 2d 348 (1948); Lee v. Anderson, 70 Ariz. 208, 218
P.2d 732 (1950); Knight v. Wingate, 205 Ga. 133, 52 S.E.2d 604 (1949); In re
Hendricksen's Estate, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953).
OF
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property law.7 This interpretation would affect all individuals dealing with government bonds, and would render a gift without a reissuance void.8 On the other hand, a minority holds that the regulations
do not determine property rights as between persons claiming ownership to the bonds, but affect only the registered holder. This assures
the government that the holder is the sole party who would be able
to claim the proceeds of the bond, 9 and avoids any possibility of involving the government in interpleader suits in discharging its
obligation. 10 Under this view, the rights of individuals involved in
transactions with government savings bonds would not be determined
by the regulations, but by the applicable local law." Under the
majority's interpretation, the attempted gift of the bonds without a
reissuance would be unsuccessful, whereby the bonds would remain
in decedent's estate for tax purposes; however, under the minority
view the attempted gift would be valid, and the bonds would not be
included in decedent's estate.
The court here followed the minority view, 12 holding that the regulations affect only the holder of record. In upholding the inter vivos
transfer 13 state property law was employed, whereby the donee under
the transaction becomes the equitable owner, and the transferor a
trustee of the proceeds. 14 The rationale used for relieving decedent's
estate from an estate tax on these bonds was that "the Estate Tax
attaches to the economic benefit to be derived from the property
rather than the technical ramifications of title."'15 No attempt was
made to reconcile the two conflicting views.
7. The rationale of the courts taking this view is that the regulations
constitute a part of the supreme law of the land; therefore, state legislation
may not properly interfere with them. Warren v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl.
634 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 739 (1930); In re Stanley's Estate, 102 Colo.
422, 80 P.2d 332 (1938); Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N.J.Eq.

11, 29 A.2d 854 (Ch. 1943); In re Deyo's Estate, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Surr. Ct.

1943).
8. "While there is a division of authority as to whether a gift inter vivos
of United States War Savings Bonds Series E is effective by physical delivery,
the weight of authority seems to be that such a gift by delivery only with
appropriate words indicating an intention to give, but without registration,
etc., in the name of the donee, is not effective, since it is in violation of the
regulations and provisions under which the bonds were issued." Brown v.
Vinson, 188 Tenn. 120, 216 S.W.2d 748, 751 (1949). See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d
788, 793 (1955).
9. These decisions justify the application of state laws of transfer by
a narrow interpretation of the Treasury regulations. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d
1221, 1233 (1954).
10. Ibid.

11. In a state where a contract of survivorship is not presumed, the court

held that the regulations could not create a contract of survivorship. Brown
v. Vinson, 188 Tenn. 120, 216 S.W.2d 748 (1949).

12. See note 9 supra.

13. See note 11 supra.
14. 259 F.2d at 733.
15. Ibid. The reported case derived this principle from the words of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939: "The value of the gross estate shall include
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The holding that the regulations were designed solely for convenient payment by the United States Government is clearly consistent
with the language of the act 16 which defines the scope of the regulations.17 It is apparent that the act [as interpreted by the majority
view] does not authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to fix title to
-or ownership of bonds by the regulations. The latter interpretation
is not only in derogation of the statute which gave breath to the
regulations, but necessarily involves an interference with state law,
in that property rights in government bonds would not be governed
by applicable local property law, but by the regulations.

TORTS-CONSPIRACY-ECONOMIC COERCION THROUGH
FORCE OF NUMBERS AS AN ACTIONABLE WRONG
Plaintiff alleged that defendants, five race track corporations,
refused to book plaintiff's greyhounds as a result of maliciously conspiring together and with other persons to prevent plaintiff from
racing his dogs on defendants' tracks. The sole motive was said to be
the precipitation of plaintiff's financial ruin. It was further alleged
that defendants through their force of numbers and economic stature
intimidated other dog track owners in the state and made them
unwilling partners in the conspiracy. Substantial damages in the
loss of sales and purses were claimed. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, held,
reversed. Although the general rule is that there can be no independent tort for conspiracy, in some circumstances mere force of numbers
acting in unison may make an actionable wrong. Snipes v. West
FlaglerKennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958).
There has been disagreement as to whether conspiracy is or ought
to be a separate tort.' It is often stated that it is not the conspiracy
itself but the damage resulting therefrom which is the basis of the

the value of all property ... to the extent of the interest therein held .. .
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(e), 53 Stat. 122 (now

INT.

REV. CODE

OF

1954, § 2040).

16. See note 1 supra.
17. "Such bonds and certificates may be sold at such price or prices, and
redeemed before maturity upon such terms as the Secretary of the Treasury
may prescribe." 49 Stat. 21 (1935), 31 U.S.C. § 757C(b) (1) (1952).
1. PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955). See Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime,
and as a Tort, 7 CoLuM. L. REV. 229 (1907); Burdick, The Tort of Conspiracy,
8 CoLum. L. REV. 117 (1908); Charlesworth, Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in Tort, 36 L.Q. REV. 38 (1920); Hughes, The Tort of Conspiracy, 15
MODERN L. REv. 209 (1952).
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cause of action. 2 Conspiracy is usually defined as a combination of
persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose unlawfully.3 But many courts have also stated that an act of a combination
of persons may have such coercive effect as to give rise to liability
even though an individual would not be liable for the act.4 Probably
the most familiar application of this principle is in the labor boycott
situation, 5 but it has been applied elsewhere. 6 The problem seems to
lie in determining the factual elements necessary for the invocation
of the principle that mere force of numbers may make a wrong.7
2. Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165 (1913); Hazelwerdt v. Industrial Indem.
Exchange, 321 P.2d 831 (Cal. App. 1958); Seno v. Franke, 16 Ill. App. 2d 39,
147 N.E.2d 469 (1957); Miller v. Ortman, 235 Ind. 641, 136 N.E.2d 17 (1956);
Sewell v. Detroit Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 345 Mich. 93, 75 N.W.2d 845 (1956);
Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N.Y. 454, 20 N.E. 376 (1889); Tennessee Publishing
Co. v. Fitzhugh, 165 Tenn. 1, 52 S.W.2d 157 (1932); Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va.
533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1956), aff'd on rehearing,96 S.E. 799 (1957).
3. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1920); Peskins v.
Squires, 319 P.2d 405 (Cal. App. 1957); Field v. Oberwortmann, 14 Ill. App.
2d 218, 144 N.E.2d 637 (1957); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Town of
Coldwater, 106 So. 2d 375 (Miss. 1958); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186
Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948); Lewis Pac. Dairymen's Ass'n v. Turner, 50
Wash. 2d 762, 314 P.2d 625 (1957).
4. E.g., Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902);
Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme, 104 Md. 218, 64 Atl. 1029 (1906); A. T.
Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82 (1927); Ertz v.
Produce Exch. Co., 79 Minn. 140, 81 N.W. 737 (1900); Place v. Minster, 65 N.Y.
89 (1875); Collins v. Cronin, 117 Pa. 35, 11 Atl. 869 (1887); Hawarden v.
Youghiogheny & Lehigh Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
The English cases seem confused. Holding that an action will lie: Pratt v.
British Medical Ass'n, [19193 1 K.B. 244; Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495;
Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 715. Apparently contra: Sorrell v. Smith
[1925] A.C. 700; Allen v. Flood [1898] A.C. 1; Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor,
Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25. For a discussion of these cases, see Charlesworth,
Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in Tort, 36 L.Q. REV. 38 (1920).
5. Fleming v. Dane, 304 Mass. 46, 50, 22 N.E.2d 609, 611 (1939). See e.g.,
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1920).
6. E.g., Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902)
(refusal to deal because selling below fixed prices); A.T. Stearns Lumber Co.
v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82 (1927) (union members refused to work
with non-union goods); State v.. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046 (1901)
(newspapers refused ads from those who advertised in a certain paper);
Hawarden v. Youghiogheny & Lehigh Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472
(1901) (wholesalers refused to sell to dealers unless members of association);
Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919] I K.B. 244 (association would boycott
or expel doctors who dealt with plaintiff).
Many of the conspiracy cases may be aligned under other general titles of
law, particularly boycotts and interference with prospective economic advantage. See PROSSER, TORTS § 106 (2d ed. 1955), where the Mogul Steamship
and Temperton v. Russell cases, cited in note 4 supra, are discussed under
interference with prospective economic advantage. In the instant case, the
court notes that the conduct was a species of financial boycott, and an analogy
is drawn to labor combination cases. 105 So. 2d at 167.
7. Courts differ in their emphasis of factors relevant to invoking the principle. For instance, Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919] 1 K.B. 244, seems to
focus on the coercion element. In Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 715
emphasis was placed on the intention of defendants to injure plaintiff. A
stronger expression of emphasis on the intent element may be found in Bliss
v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Ore. 634, 321 P.2d 324 (1958), where it was held that
for an action to lie the primary purpose of a conspiracy must be to cause
injury to another. In the Mogul Steamship case the conspiring defendants
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The Florida court in the present case agrees that the ordinary rule
is that "civil conspiracy is not an independent tort, and the sufficiency
of a complaint in such cases is to be determined by the otherwise
tortious character of the acts alleged."8 But the court then adopts the
reasoning of a line of Massachusetts cases 9 in recognizing what it
terms an exception to the ordinary rule when the fact of combination
results in a peculiar power to coerce the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the conspiring defendants maliciously refused to contract
and intimidated other track owners so that they would not contract
with him.'0 The majority opinion" held that although an individual is
under no obligation to contract, plaintiff's allegations were sufficient
to place his case within the "mere force of numbers" exception to the
general rule.
The opinion in this case is a late demonstration of the fact that the
law of civil conspiracy is uncertain. The exception relied on by this
court and by a good many others 12 seems not to be an exception but
a principle inconsistent with the one which states that no independent
action for conspiracy will lie. But if the rule is that an action for
conspiracy will lie even though no other tortious act is alleged, the
question of the elements necessary for invoking the rule remains
unanswered because the court fails to set them out.13 It may be that
the general failure of the courts to set up specific rules is not unintentional. 14 But a lack of general, consistent principles is a lack of meaningful law. The failure to establish them has resulted in extended
confusion.15 Clear statements as to whether conspiracy is to be recognized as an independent tort, and its composite elements if so recogintended to injure plaintiffs by forcing them out of the China trade, but
defendants prevailed, the court holding that business competition was a just
excuse. For a criticism of any use of a motive test, as well as of the action
in general, see Hughes, The Tort of Conspiracy, 15 MODERN L. REV. 209 (1952).
For an assertion that motive is properly a determing factor in some tort
actions, see Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful
Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV. 411 (1905).
8. 105 So. 2d at 164.
9. Fleming v. Dane, 304 Mass. 46, 22 N.E.2d 609 (1939); Deslauries v. Shea,
300 Mass. 30, 13 N.E.2d 932 (1938); Willett v. Herrick, 242 Mass. 471 136 N.E.
366 (1922); Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N.E. 841 (1914).
10. 105 So. 2d at 165.
11. The decision was 4-1. Roberts, J., dissented, primarily on the ground
that the allegations of the complaint were too vague.
12. See notes 4 through 7 supra.
13. The court refers to the allegations of a combination, intent to injure,
improper motive, peculiar power through force of numbers and economic
stature, coercion, and resultant damage; but it is not clearly stated whether
all of these elements must be alleged in order to state a cause of action.
14. See 39 HARv. L. REV. 517 (1926), indicating that there are no established
principles and that many cases involving economic coercion are properly
decided on the particular facts according to the court's idea of social and
economic policy.
15. Dating at least from the time of the cases of Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor,
Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25, and Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 715.
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nized, would do much to eliminate the existing uncertainty and would
not be so restricting as to result in injustice in particular cases.16
16. If the action is recognized and its elements are determined, a great deal

of maneuvering room would remain since to some extent the courts must
determine the degree of proof required to establish such elements as improper
motive, peculiar power, and economic coercion.

